

Research Foundations in Social Sciences

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
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Research Foundations in Social Sciences

- I. The first section focuses on the great traditions in Political Philosophy and Sociology.
- II. The second section looks European governance and social sciences more specifically at International Relations theory, surveying the Realist, Liberal, and Constructivist paradigms.
- III. The third section turns attention to the disciplinary development of Political Science and the major approaches which characterize the contemporary discipline, paying particular attention to the New Functionalisms and New Institutionalisms.



Great tradition in political philosophy and sociology

First section

Great traditions in Political Philosophy and its consequences


New paradigms
in political
philosophy

The Nation
State

The principle of
subsidiarity

Contemporary
Political Science
approaches

The Machiavellian Revolution



New
science of
politics

- Epistemological discontinuity with ancient thought, the Augustinism and Thomism
- Distinction between State of nature, natural law and the law

New rule
in politics


- The law is the source of the will of the people, of the nobles and the Prince
- Monopoly of legitimate violence and providence of the State

New
framework
for action
in policy

- Sovereignty and Government
- Nation-State
- The realization of his ego

Le Prince, 1513
Discours sur la première décade de Tite-Live, 1531
Thoughts on Machiavelli, 1958

The Hobbesian Revolution: "The origins of the State in Europe"



De Cive, 1640,
Human Nature,
1649
Léviathan, 1651

Building an
artificiality

- The state of nature can not be the foundation of politics.
- Distinction between the state of nature, the natural law and the Law

New Rules
in Politics

- The State offers a possibility of endless actions
- Monopoly of legitimate violence

New
Framework
for political
action

- The sovereignty of the individual
- The Sovereignty of the Law and the State

The pre-rationalism


*Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain (1705) &
La Monadologie (1714)*

Wilhelm Leibniz(1646-1716)

- I. According to Leibniz, monads are elementary particles with blurred perceptions of one another. Monads can also be compared to the corpuscles of the Mechanical Philosophy of René Descartes and others. Monads are the ultimate elements of the universe. **The monads are "substantial forms of being" with the following properties: they are eternal, indecomposable, individual, subject to their own laws, un-interacting, and each reflecting the entire universe in a pre-established harmony (a historically important example of panpsychism). Monads are centers of force; substance is force, while space, matter, and motion are merely phenomenal.**
- II. The ontological essence of a monad is its irreducible simplicity. Unlike atoms, monads possess no material or spatial character. They also differ from atoms by their complete mutual independence, so that interactions among monads are only apparent. Instead, by virtue of the principle of pre-established harmony, each monad follows a preprogrammed set of "instructions" peculiar to itself, so that a monad "knows" what to do at each moment. By virtue of these intrinsic instructions, each monad is like a little mirror of the universe. Monads need not be "small"; e.g., each human being constitutes a monad, in which case free will is problematic.



The pre-rationalism II



Mathematics of Politics

- Reason is a natural method of thinking that it is necessary to strengthen by means of instruments that increase its efficiency and palliate its defect of intuitive evidence

Social Mathematics

- Financial mathematics to evaluate life annuities and a mathematical theory of games that he puts into a universal mathematics that cares about qualities and relationships, not just quantities.

Mathematics of the individual

- A subject operating from his power of acting, a metaphysical agent who perceives, aspires to the development of his virtuosities, and expresses an irreducible point of view, at the crossroads of the relations which constitute him.

Revolution of John Locke (1632-1704)

Essai philosophique concernant l'entendement humain
(1690)

Deux Traités du Gouvernement Civil publié en 1680

- I. Differences between people's ideas do not arise from differences in their ability to perceive or release innate ideas, but differences in experience;
- II. The contractualisation of the company with reference to a state of nature implies that the right of conservation is intimately linked to the right of property.
- III. The only effective guarantee of the rights of individuals remains the possibility of an endless accumulation. The attainment of pleasure would be all the more legitimate because it would divert human passions.
- IV. The defense of property is not simply the defense of the right to life; it is the tool that will achieve the attainment of pleasure;
- V. In the state of nature men are naturally free. Men are therefore in a state of perfect equality;
- VI. Political freedom does not reside in "I want", but in "I can", and therefore the political domain must be constituted in such a way that power and freedom combine.

John Locke (1632-1704)



Revolution of John Locke (1632-1704)

- I. A spontaneous formation of the law prior to the appearance of the State whose function is more to guarantee than to create the law;
- II. The mission of the State is to preserve what has been achieved, without being able to attempt it, and men will relinquish only the minimum: the right to punish;
- III. The gain of political society is to enable men to safeguard their property; Preservation appears as the finality of the social contract;
- IV. Definition of representative government: "Although they are bound by a contractual relationship, the members of the people have no contractual obligation to the government, and the rulers benefit from the government only as a member of the political body";
- V. Letter on the Toleration of 1689: "The Church is a society of men, who voluntarily join together to serve God in public, and to render to him the worship which they deem to be agreeable to him, and suitable for their salvation ".


Hannah Arendt : new interpretation of liberalism



The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1951
Between Past and Future, Six Exercises in Political Thought, 1961
On Revolution, 1963


Charles-Louis de Montesquieu (1689-1755)

*Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains,
et de leur décadence (1734)*




Charles-Louis de Montesquieu (1689-1755)

De l'esprit des lois (1748)



Giambattista Vico (1668-1744)

Les principes d'une science nouvelle relative à la nature commune des nations- 1725



Georg Hegel (1770-1831):

L'Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques en abrégé (1817) & Principes de la philosophie ou droit naturel et science de l'État en abrégé (1821)

Holism : The theory that parts of a whole are in intimate interconnection, such that they cannot exist independently of the whole, or cannot be understood without reference to the whole, which is thus regarded as greater than the sum of its parts



Dialectic

- Man is an autonomous, secular and rational being. It is above all an individual endowed with natural rights who knows no unity of value superior to himself and whose reason is exercised by the calculation of his own interests. Competition between individuals generates balance and progress.

Idea

- Each philosophical system crowns the development of a cultural world and expresses it, while at the same time contributing, as a positive or negative stage, to accomplish the process dialectic of the Idea

History

- History will be cyclical in the sense that each people who plays a role in history experiences successively a period of formation, a period of maturity and finally a period of fall and decadence which takes place "under the shock of the instrument Future of universal history";

Georg Hegel (1770-1831): hic et nunc !

- I. History will be cyclical in the sense that each people who plays a role in history experiences successively a period of formation, a period of maturity and finally a period of fall and decadence which takes place "under the shock of the instrument Future of universal history";
- II. Liberty asserts itself as the right of every subject. Or rather every human being affirming himself as a subject claims this freedom and, in fact, begins to act accordingly.
- III. Justice can not, therefore, be a mere question of abstract morality; it is a political problem in the highest degree and it is an empty form; it has, on the contrary, a precise content: the development of liberty;
- IV. Reduced to abstract principles, the construction of a state becomes impossible. Worse, in the absence of concrete determinations, that is to say, for lack of the institutional and legal means defining what freedom and equality mean, these categories become destructive. Freedom without determination is the absence of laws and leads to tyranny. The abstract equality leads to the negation of all political organization and to the chaos in which Hegel sees the origin of the Terror.



Georg Hegel (1770-1831) :

The State : agent of meaning and transformation

- I. From now on, what happens on the public scene is seen as a conflict between subjective acts of interpretation. Everyone wants to make legitimate, wants to make his vision. In return, each subject is a permanent forum for de-legitimizing interpretations proposed by others. The acts of interpretation of others are burdened with deficiencies which I, of course, am in a position to correct;
- II. In such a situation the State is seriously threatened. Political life even seems impossible. The political edifice is an unstable sum of rights that groups or individuals have managed to wrest from the whole. The state is then reduced to a Notstaat which has the monopoly of violence but in no way prevents the unbridled competition between individuals who defend privileges or forget economic advantages;
- III. Nevertheless, men want a reconciliation of freedom and legitimacy. Hegel thus assigns a precise mandate to the law of his rational state: it is a question of correcting the centrifugal freedom of all beings, of educating it through a process of culture. The means of such a work are found in an affirmation of the sovereignty of the State and then in the independence of the judiciary and of the civil service;
- IV. The state is obviously neutral from the confessional point of view. The maintenance of common morality and unity in culture, which formerly were the task of the Church, became the task of the State;
- V. Labor domination, artifice and destruction of the State


Hegel and Holism

- I. The Hegelian concept of "objective spirit" is the equivalent of what sociologists of the first tradition will understand as society. This notion designates all that is given in the conduct and in human productions, that "I do not know what" which constitutes the concrete totality towards which suggest an amendment Social activities. It refers to a totality irreducible to its manifestations, as the language which can not be reduced to speech. The distinction that Geoffrey Hartman makes after Hegel between "objective spirit" and "objectivized spirit" posits the principle of a factual meaning, the objectified spirit being everything that is engendered in each of the behaviors and concrete works Without being immediately reducible to them. So that if there are things that can make sense, there is just as much of the sense of fact in the objectified state.
- II. From the Hegelian tradition arises the idea that there exists a strictly human order which is characterized by its own laws, irreducible to those governing material phenomena. These are "quasi-things" which have almost the reality of things in that they are not the creation of one and are imposed on social subjects. They are what Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote about language, neither things nor ideas, or rather both, at the same time, symbolic realities that present both a material dimension and a spiritual dimension. Truly symbolic facts are distinguished from natural facts in that they are not necessary, that they are contingent, conventional, "arbitrary" in the sense of Ferdinand de Saussure. The principle of the relative autonomy of the symbolic order can thus be laid down, since social activities are irreducible to material, geographical or biological conditioning.

Karl Marx (1818-1883)

Le Manifeste du Parti Communiste (1848), *le 18 Brumaire de Louis Bonaparte* (1852), *le Capital* (1867)

- I. The history of every society up to the present day has been nothing but the history of the class struggle;
- II. The existence of classes is linked only to certain historical phases of the development of production;
- III. The class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat;
- IV. This dictatorship itself represents only a transition towards the abolition of all classes towards a classless society;
- V. The historical analysis of social classes is nothing but the analysis of class struggles and their effects;
- VI. The ideology of the class is created in confrontation with another class;
- VII. Bourgeois society only engenders new conditions of oppression;
- VIII. Social classes are determined by their economic role, their place in material production and not in political and social organization;
- IX. The political struggle of the proletariat reaches its objective only on the condition that it continue until the abolition of wage-labor, of the capital-labor-wage relation which is the social relation of fundamental production.



Hegemonic models

- I. Since the emergence of private property and the state, all societies - slave, feudal, capitalist - have been divided into classes: a ruling class, which controls the means of production of economic wealth and the state; An oppressed class that brings together those who produce wealth through their work without exercising control over the means of production and political power; And intermediate classes which are constituted by those who exercise limited control over economic and / or political power, eg civil servants, artisans, intellectuals and farmers. It is the transformation of the relations of economic production and the struggle between social classes that results from it that determine the transition from one type of society to another.
- II. The natural laws of capitalism-the search for maximum profit and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall-inevitably lead to the concentration of capital and the means of production, leading to crises of overproduction, an increase in unemployment and an impoverishment of the oppressed classes . The survival of capitalism depends on
- III. The expansion of its market and its outlets, and thus of its expansion on a global scale.
- IV. The enrichment of the rich countries is inversely proportional to that of the poor countries. For addition theorists, it is currently impossible for the countries of the South to develop, since the development of the countries of the North is based on the underdevelopment of those of the South.
- V. Principles of cultural hegemony and values as a stage of economic and political hegemony.
- VI. Principles of hegemonic cooperation and regulation in the international financial field (IMF, World Bank, OECD, etc.).

Modèle de
Marx

Modèle de
Gramsci

Modèle de
Gilpin

Modèle de
Gunder Franck
& Prebisch

Nation-state source of political modernity I

- ❖ In Leviathan, Hobbes set out his doctrine of the foundation of states and legitimate governments and creating an objective science of morality. This gave rise to social contract theory. Leviathan was written during the English Civil War; much of the book is occupied with demonstrating the necessity of a strong central authority to avoid the evil of discord and civil war.
- ❖ Beginning from a mechanistic understanding of human beings and the passions, Hobbes postulates what life would be like without government, a condition which he calls the state of nature (*bellum omnium contra omnes*).
- ❖ In such a state, people fear death, and lack both the things necessary to commodious living, and the hope of being able to toil to obtain them. So in order to avoid it people accede to a social contract and establish a civil society. According to Hobbes, society is a population beneath a sovereign authority, to whom all individuals in that society cede some rights for the sake of protection. Any power exercised by this authority can not be resisted because the protector's sovereign power derives from individuals' surrendering their own sovereign power for protection.
- ❖ There is no doctrine of separation of powers in Hobbes's discussion. According to Hobbes, the sovereign must control civil, military, judicial, and ecclesiastical powers.

The State differs from Religion and natural law

Social contract & national sovereignty

❖ *Jean- Jacques Rousseau Du Contrat Social (1762)*

- ❖ In this desired social contract, everyone will be free because they all forfeit the same amount of rights and impose the same duties on all. Rousseau argues that it is absurd for a man to surrender his freedom for slavery; thus, the participants must have a right to choose the laws under which they live.
- ❖ Rousseau posits that the political aspects of a society should be divided into two parts. First, there must be a sovereign consisting of the whole population, women included, that represents the general will and is the legislative power within the state. The second division is that of the government, being distinct from the sovereign. This division is necessary because the sovereign cannot deal with particular matters like applications of the law. Doing so would undermine its generality, and therefore damage its legitimacy. Thus, government must remain a separate institution from the sovereign body. When the government exceeds the boundaries set in place by the people, it is the mission of the people to abolish such government, and begin anew.
- ❖ When Rousseau uses the word democracy, he refers to a direct democracy rather than a representative democracy. In light of the relation between population size and governmental structure, Rousseau argues that, like his native Geneva, small city-states are the form of nation in which freedom can best flourish. For states of this size, an elected aristocracy is preferable, and in very large states a benevolent monarch; but even monarchical rule, to be legitimate, must be subordinate to the sovereign rule of law.

The Nation: the Sum of Sovereignities

Nation-State and the French Revolution

- ❖ The French Revolution wanted to renew the “human race” more than to reform France (Tocqueville in the Old Regime and the Revolution 1856).,

The French Revolution poses the pre-existence of an absolute (the sovereignty of the people, the nation assembled substituting the sovereignty of the monarch by divine right, ultimate and definitive meaning of the producer of the story, in which are crushed any form of action human, to establish a terror in the name of the absolute.

- ❖ **Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen Article III** - The principle of any sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation. No body, no individual can exert authority which does not emanate expressly from it.

The sovereignty of the law in the Nation

Nation-state and citizenship

- ❖ Ernest Renan, in 1882 "Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation ?« : "the desire to live together, the will to continue promoting the legacy we received undivided. "He said" the existence of a nation is a plebiscite of every day. "
- ❖ Whereas German writers like Fichte had defined the nation by objective criteria such as a race or an ethnic group "sharing common characteristics" (language, etc.), Renan defined it by the desire of a people to live together, which he summarized by a famous phrase, "avoir fait de grandes choses ensemble, vouloir en faire encore" (having done great things together and wishing to do more).
- ❖ It's mandatory that citizenship was closely associated with an abstract design of the Nation. It's a negation of cultural, religious and linguistic plurality of the French citizens.
- ❖ Citizenship is a constructive process which is not limited to the detention of political rights and nationality. Community Citizens Dominique Schnapper

Citizenship a permanent process

Nation-State, parliamentarism & referendum

- ❖ National Sovereignty implies the existence of representative government, that is to say a political system in which legislative power is held by parliamentary assemblies elected. The power can not be delegated or shared (Sovereignty is indivisible); the office of representatives shall be limited in time (Sovereignty is inalienable); the nation can not delegate the exercise of sovereignty definitively (Sovereignty is inalienable).
- ❖ The principle of national sovereignty also implies prohibition of the imperative mandate. Parliamentarians do not represent the only voters who elected them, but the nation as a whole. These are "the people's representatives." The prohibition of the imperative mandate is the logical consequence of this design, because such a principle would be to link the representative to the will of the represented. the principles of national sovereignty and popular sovereignty are not always mutually exclusive of the other.
- ❖ L'article 3 de la constitution du 4 octobre 1958 dispose ainsi que "la Souveraineté nationale appartient au peuple qui l'exerce par ses représentants et par la voie du référendum. L'article 27 dispose pour sa part que "tout mandat impératif est nul".

National sovereignty = popular sovereignty

Nation State, legal framework & public policy

- ❖ *Contributions à la théorie générale de l'Etat* (1921), Carré de Malberg
- ❖ In legal terms, the main criterion of the state is that the exercise of sovereignty, which is an unconditioned power, which all other powers derived. This means that within the territory of which it is responsible, the State has the competence of its powers. the state is unitary.
- ❖ The action of the state is no longer limited only to the functions related to the exercise of sovereignty. Its scope was expanded in many areas where there is a public interest that can not be satisfied by the action of individuals (eg education, health, culture, research ...).
- ❖ Meanwhile, the redistributive function of taxation was imposed. The emergence of the "welfare state" marks a real transformation of the nation state: institutional framework of the exercise of power, it has also become an element of social and national cohesion and a guarantor of equality between individuals that compose it..

L'Unification de la Loi et l'Egalité devant la Loi

Nation State and Republic

- ❖ An indivisible "no part of the people, nor any individual, may usurp the exercise of national sovereignty. Only the people exercise sovereignty through its representatives.
- ❖ The secular nature of the Republic follows both from the principle of freedom of belief and the principle of equality of citizens before the law and involves the separation of church and state.
- ❖ No religion has a privileged status within the Republic and each individual has the freedom to hold opinions and faith.
- ❖ The democratic character of the republic implies respect for fundamental freedoms and the designation of different powers by universal suffrage (open to all adult citizens) equal (each voter has one vote) and secret (each vote freely away any pressure).
- ❖ Finally, the social character of the Republic resulting from the affirmation of the principle of equality. This is to contribute to social cohesion.

The British Experience of the State




Agents disrupting the Nation-State model



ALTHUSIUS (1557-1638) :

Aux sources du Fédéralisme organique



Ecole de Salamanque :

Aux sources du droit limitant le Politique



Francisco
de Vitoria
(1483-
1546)

- De Jure belli Hispanorum in barbaros, 1532
- Freedom of movement of persons, goods and ideas
- Theory on jus gentium


Francisco
Suárez
(1548-1617)

- De Legibus 1612, Distinction between private and public law
- La Defensio Fidei 1614 The State and the Law can have no other ends than the materiality of human society
- Limit of Government by Justice. Religion is only an indirect limit of the power of the State
- De Bello, 1621 Universal Sovereignty can not exist

Martín
d'Azpilcueta
(1493-1586)

- Treaty on Usury and Simony 1569;
- Quantitative Theory of Money
- Legitimate Theory of Interest

Oswald von Nell-Breuning (1889-1991) : l'invention contemporaine de la subsidiarité



History of
Power

- Reconciling the tradition of stateless society and the federal tradition of the German

Regulation

- A way of defining the role of the State in society, of justifying its intervention as a guarantor of the common good, but also of limiting it as a servant of individuals and communities

Instrument of
criticism of
totalitarianism

- To discredit the voluntarism of the modern state through the distorting prism of totalitarianism, to whom it would be necessary to have revealed the irredeemably malignant nature of politics

Encyclique Quadra-
gesimo anno,
Pie XI, 1931

*Grundsätzliches zur
Politik*, 1975

Denis de Rougemont (1906-1985)

A la recherche d'une Europe des fonctions et des régions

Lettre ouverte aux Européens- 1970

Europe des Régions

- I. The idea of "regions with variable geometry", functional regions ignoring administrative or state boundaries (the idea of cross-border regions, of which it is one of the earliest theorists), and whose size varies because of the problems to be solved: Education will not be that of planning, that of transport will not be that of water management, and so on.
- II. Between the commune (too small) and the state (too big), the region offers the citizen the concrete possibility to deal with the issues that concern him. It thus presents itself as a "space for civic participation" which will be the foundation of federated Europe.

Fédéralisme

- I. To the nation-state it opposes the idea of a federalism based on the reconstitution of the intermediate bodies and the systematic use of the principle of sufficient competence, that is to say the principle of subsidiarity.
- II. Politically, he believes that respect for the individual requires democracy, since the federation alone can reconcile the freedom of each individual, the diversity of cultures and the unity of the whole.
- III. De Rougemont opposes to the "national myths" a "Europe of realities" constituted by a "Federation of Regions" based on the plurality of allegiances.

The conservative-liberal principle of subsidiarity

Subsidiarity as the general rule that whatever individuals alone or in a group can perform on their own should not be transferred to the next level

The State does not have to act but to govern, that is to say to control, to regulate and to promote, whilst intervening whenever individuals, alone or as a group, fail, according to the idea of an organic complementarity of the different communities

Subsidiarity can be read as the expression of a variant of federalism which becomes "societal" and cultural, and which considers social life in its entirety outside the question of the state

An alternative to the welfare state, the cultural state

Great worldviews and research approaches are salient in social sciences

Positivism : A philosophical system recognizing only that which can be scientifically verified or which is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and therefore rejecting metaphysics and theism.

Rationalism : The theory that reason rather than experience is the foundation of certainty in knowledge. The theory that laws and their operation derive validity from the fact of having been enacted by authority or of deriving logically from existing decisions, rather than from any moral considerations

Individualism : A social theory favouring freedom of action for individuals over collective or state control.

Methodological individualism

- I. Methodological individualism makes the individual a primary reality. Rational actors, individuals, situated socially, develop behaviors whose consciousness is in principle. They are autonomous in relation to the constraints of the external economic and social structures. However, the "atoms" of the "individualistic" analysis are not only individuals, but also their interrelations within the framework of rules and constraints that limit their margins of play. From this point of view, society is an entanglement Complex interaction systems.
- II. The notion of the individual as the principle of every thing, including the social thing, is in solidarity with a mode of thought and a vision of the world which, in the eighteenth century, found in the formation of a system of philosophical thought, Economic, legal, political and religious, its most complete form, what is today called the theory of rational action. The action is based on the intentional choice of an actor free of any economic and social conditioning.

Methodological individualism II

- I. The starting point for the individualist paradigm is the simple fact that all social interactions are after all interactions among individuals.
- II. The individual in the economy or in the society is like the atom in chemistry; whatever happens can ultimately be described exhaustively in terms of the individuals involved.
- III. Of course, the individuals do not act separately. They respond to each other, but each acts within a range limited by the behavior of others as well as by constraints personal to the individual, such as his or her ability or wealth.

Methodological individualism and game theory

- I. In a game, each agent chooses one among a set of strategies available to him or her. In the usual formulations, the set of available strategies is fixed, independent of the choices of others.
- II. The outcome or payoff of the game for each player is a function of the strategies of all the players. Hence, all the interactions among players are embodied in the payoff functions.
- III. The choice of actions is totally individualistic. For the game formulation to be meaningful, the outcomes defined by the payoff functions must be possible; for example, demand should never exceed supply for any commodity.
- IV. It has proved difficult to define competitive equilibrium as the outcome of a non-cooperative game. It is not difficult to construct a game whose equilibrium point is a competitive equilibrium.

Limits of methodological individualism

- I. Scientific sociology has been formed against this system of thought. Far from taking this notion as the starting point of sociological analysis, Emile Durkheim takes it as an object to determine the social conditions of its appearance. It refers to the increase in the division of social labor which it assimilates to a process of individuation at the end of which empirical agents are constituted as "beings of reason", normative subjects of institutions, Can not, in his view, "deduce the individual from society".
- II. The "individual" as the active principle of the unification of the self is the result of a work of institutionalization whose proper name and signature are the most well-known forms. To the individual who is to himself his own principle, sociologists will oppose social man. But the "social" is not reduced to the collective, the opposition between individual and collective phenomena being irrelevant since the "social" is instited in a multifaceted way: in the state of material objects (books, Tools) and in institutions (the School, the Church), in mechanisms (economic markets), and in dispositions and ways of being sustainable that result from learning (explicit or implicit) and A process of incorporation, which Pierre Bourdieu calls habitus.

Limits of methodological individualism II

- I. However, the opposition between the individual and the collective is so well established in the division of disciplines, in the ordinary and scholarly cognitive categories, that a sociologist like Norbert Elias, for example, has to resort to metaphors, those of the net and House, dance and music or conversation to remind that any analysis must start from the "structure of the whole to understand the shape of its different parts". It also structures the problems and the space of production in the social sciences: individualism and holism, subject and object, interior and exterior, so many binary schemes whose foundation is more political than theoretical, each term referring to antagonistic social philosophies, As the opposition between determinism and freedom, even politics, like that between liberalism and collectivism. The analysis of the class unconscious, which is generally to the principle of the use of these categories, can be carried further: one is "individualistic" for oneself and "determinist" for others, "subject" for self and "object" for others. Michel Foucault even saw in the process of individualization the exercise of a "continuous", "precise", "atomic" power, differentiated power, but also differentiating in order to decompose the collective, the power fearing the strength of the groups mobilized.
- II. The notion of field, which can be defined as a space of objective relations between individuals competing for a specific stake, was used by Pierre Bourdieu to recall that the true object of a social science is not the " Even if one can only construct a field from individuals since the information necessary for statistical analysis is inevitably attached to them. Therefore, the field must be at the center of research operations. This does not imply that individuals do not exist. But sociology reconstructs them as agents socially constituted as acting in the field, because they possess properties necessary to be effective.

Systemism/Functionalism

- I. Everything, whether concrete or abstract, is a system or an actual or potential component of a system;
- II. systems have systemic (emergent) features that their components lack, whence
- III. all problems should be approached in a systemic rather than in a sectoral fashion;
- IV. all ideas should be put together into systems (theories); and
- V. the testing of anything, whether idea or artifact, assumes the validity of other items, which are taken as benchmarks, at least for the time being.

Theoretical system of Parsons

- I. It was only in 1951, however, in Parsons, in *The Social System*, and then in the collective work published with Shils, *Toward a General Theory of Action*, that his theory of action was presented. This theory was later clarified, reworked, modified in the *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (1953), and then in a large number of articles and works, notably in the volume published by Parsons with Shils under the title *Theories of Society* (1961) and which is a collection of classical commented texts.
- II. The theoretical system of Parsons constitutes a broad conceptual framework for the study of social action. It is based first and foremost on the idea that, in order to exist and maintain, every social system must meet four functional imperatives: goal attainment, adaptation to the surrounding environment, integration of members into the Social system, normative or latent stability (pattern maintenance). Moreover, according to Parsons, every action results from a choice between five fundamental alternatives to which it has given the name of variable patterns: affectivity or affective neutrality (control of impulses); Universalism (general criteria of judgment) or particularism; Quality or performance; Self-orientation or community orientation; Specificity or diffusion. This scheme, which not only characterizes the actions and roles of individuals, but also analyzes the specific values of global societies, has been applied by Parsons to the analysis of various realities (family, social strata, professions).
- III. The structuro-functionalism of Parsons has been criticized for not reporting social change. However, Parsons devoted himself to the comparative study of societies and their evolution (*Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*, 1966). It defines an objective criterion: a society is more advanced insofar as its social organization shows a greater capacity of adaptation. This notion of adaptation does not mean a passive adjustment to the given conditions, but the search for a more satisfactory state, hence a capacity for innovation. On this point, Parsons joins the evolutionary theories of Spencer and Durkheim. One criterion for this adaptability is differentiation: a unit fulfilling several functions is divided into subunits, each of which fulfills one of these functions. This differentiation, however, is only a sign of progress if the differentiated units perform the function better than the previous multifunctional unit. Such specialization, the reintegration of new units, leads to a transformation of the value system. When a social system becomes complicated, the system of values must be simplified, the most appropriate values being the most general and the most universal. Among his later works, the *Sociological Theory and Modern Society* (1967), *Politics and Social Structure* (1969), and *The American University* (1973).

Theoretical systems of Merton

- For Robert K. Merton in *Social Theory and Social Structure* (1949), is it not questionable to assert in the first place that the institutions which make up a society necessarily articulate harmoniously (postulate of functional unity)? It is known that in the same society, several religions can coexist and provoke conflicts between rival groups. In this case, it is difficult to assert that the integrating role usually devolved to the religious institution works best. Should we not also challenge the idea that every institution necessarily fulfills a positive function (a postulate of universal functionalism) and a vital postulate of necessity? Here again Merton replied in the affirmative. Cultural forms can have varying effects from one social group to another, positive for some, negative for others.
- As for the postulate of necessity, which systematically associates a need with an institution, it superbly ignores that a single element can have several functions or that, conversely, the same function can be fulfilled by interchangeable elements.
- For Merton, the objective is to dispel the confusion so frequent between the conscious and voluntary motivations that animate a behavior (manifest function) and the resulting objective consequences (latent function).
- The theorem of creative prediction (or Thomas's theorem) is another useful instrument for understanding many sequences of social life. By virtue of this theorem, the anticipation of an event can structure behaviors in such a way that they bring about its advent. For example, if a student does not pass the exam, he or she will not be able to edit properly and make a bad copy.
- The notion of "relative frustration" thus allows us to take the measure of the discrepancy that sometimes exists between the group of belonging of an individual and the group of reference to which the latter turns to define his conduct and fix his representations of the world. Merton is also aware that the legitimate resources available to individuals do not always live up to the objectives most valued by the society of which they are members (individual success, for example). When the means and the goals can not adjust, deviance and anomie are often at the rendezvous.

Limits of Systemism

- Despite these numerous amendments to the undeniable heuristic virtues, functionalism is the victim, from the mid-1960s, of many critical waves. As American society loses international hegemony and registers growing tensions within it, the intellectual radiance of functionalism weakens to the benefit of other paradigms such as structuralism or interactionism. Yet he will not cease to exert influences as many as diffuse. In the United States, Randall Collins (1956) shows that social conflict is not just a pathological symptom, contrary to what may be suggested by an unduly superficial reading of Parsons' work. The conflict is functional because it is also part of the process of integration and cohesion of social groups. A few years later, in a very different perspective, Christian Baudelot and Roger Establet propose to assimilate the French school system to an institution whose primary function is not so much to transmit knowledge as to organize the reproduction of relations Social class (The Capitalist School in France, 1971). Functionalism of the worst will think certain, so the schema must then to the thesis of the ruse of the capitalist reason. In Germany, at the same time, Jürgen Habermas combines systemic analysis with critical theory to analyze more generally the transformations of advanced capitalism (Legitimationprobleme im Spätkapitalismus, 1973). But in this same country, Parsons mainly influences Niklas Luhmann, a jurist converted to sociology, who takes up the thesis of differentiating between subsystems and adopts the approach in terms of the media of communication. Progressively, however, Luhmann emerges from the Parsonian grip to found a self-poetic theory of society, autopoiesis designating this capacity of systems to self-observe, to produce their own structure and above all to shape the difference between Themselves and their environment (Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, 1997).

Sociological traditions

- I. The sociologists claiming Durkheim (1858-1917) and his Rules of Sociological Methods share the conviction that sociology is a science like the others and that it must use the same procedures: definition of the object, Hypotheses, empirical verification (by statistics and their covariations, substitutes for experimentation), theoretical interpretation. They implement probabilistic patterns of causality and set as their primary objective "the study of the complex determinations of specific situations", according to Jean-Claude Combessie's expression. If, according to Durkheim, the social determines individual behaviors (translated into social facts such as suicide rates, distinct from individual suicides), it is because it exerts constraints constituting these social facts.
- II. Others, claiming to be Karl Marx (1818-1883) and his historical materialism, interpret the significant correlations that persist in time as indices of the determination of the practices and representations of individuals by their "social being" That is to say their inscription in social relations and in particular social classes. These social relations, internalized, shape individual behaviors, practices and representations. But individuals are not passively determined; they can escape from their most likely destiny, like those peasants or "revolutionary" intellectuals who, according to Marx, rank with the working class (class for oneself and not in oneself) to Because of their "intelligence of history."

Sociological traditions II

- I. Finally, others use the vocabulary of social determinations without precise theoretical references to reveal inequalities of class, age, sex or any other belonging to categories translated into "independent" (determining) variables. Inequalities in access to public goods (schooling, health, social housing, security, etc.) or inequalities in income or consumption, these practices are translated into "dependent" (determined) variables and the correlations between the two kinds of variables. As dependencies are always linked to the context of data collection.
- II. If no sociologist adheres today to the theory of the single cause and the mechanical determination of structures on behaviors, statistical dependencies, multiple and probabilistic, can be interpreted either as constraints limiting the scope of possible decisions, Or as conditioning incentives for the reproduction of practices. For the poorest, at the bottom of the social ladder, scarce resources limiting possible choices are real causes of suffering, frustration and sometimes social reproduction (or exclusion). For the most favored, multiple resources allow choices among the most risky and the most profitable.
- III. In the wake of Paul Lazarsfeld (1901-1976), practitioners of this "quantitative" sociology, sometimes called "scientific" (but also "positivist"), have deepened, criticized and complicated statistical analysis techniques and conditions of causal imputation which is at the heart of this sociological practice. Causality concerns probabilistic determinations of categories and not the mechanical determinism of individuals (Raymond Boudon and Paul Lazarsfeld, 1966), but it can nevertheless lead to considerable inequalities between individuals belonging to the extreme categories, in particular the very different chances of mobility and of social success. The relationships between social origin, academic achievement and socio-professional trajectory represent a major theme of this sociology.

The Weberian Model

From Max Weber (1864-1920) and the publication of his posthumous work, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, sociologists have become accustomed to distinguishing four ideal types of human actions, two of which relate primarily to community social relations (Vergemeinschaftung) Traditional action and emotional action (Affektual), and two of the societal relations (Vergesellschaftung): rational action in finality, of instrumental type (Zweckrationalität), and rational action in value, of axiological type (Wertrationalität). Part of the Weberian posterity has been to resume, criticize, develop, amend this "comprehensive" type of typology.

Rational choice and methodological individualism

- I. The theory of rational choice has attempted to complicate and sometimes to influence the models of analysis of rational action as implemented by economists. According to the latter, a behavior is said to be rational as soon as it can be modeled by means of the optimization of the benefit / cost ratio. But for the sociologists of "rational choice", optimization is done in a situation of constraint, which leads them to redefine a "social rationality" distinct from the versions of the rationality of the economic and political sciences. This social rationality presupposes that individuals mobilize resources to achieve very different objectives under varying constraints. When these objectives are "substantial" (monetary translatable), maximization is assumed: the benefit / cost calculation can be applied according to the homo oeconomicus model. Where objectives are "operational" (non-monetary), there are cases of limited or complex rationality, for example where access to resources and information for decision-making is very uneven or where capacity is too Apply the same data processing to make decisions.
- II. The question of whether an extended model of "social rationality" is applicable to all concrete cases remains open (Siegwart Lindenberg, 2001). Indeed, it involves the "axiological rationality" defined by Max Weber as the relationship between action and adherence to values. For this reason, in order to better distinguish and relate the various forms of rationality, Raymond Boudon, delineating the methodological individualism of rational choice alone, developed the concept of "cognitive rationality" (1995) to designate It is common for all rational behavior to be justified by "good reasons", whether economic (interest), moral or ethical (value) or even logical (cognition).
- III. Thus redefined, "methodological individualism", including the theory of rational choice, proceeds by means of modeling individual actions to explain a correlation considered significant or a historical relationship deemed exemplary by the "good reasons" of the individual actors considered as Abstract types

Strategic analysis: the actor and the system

- Based on the work of Herbert Simon (1947) on limited rationality, and those of Michel Crozier on the French administration and *Le Phénomène bureaucratique* (1964), this trend is related to the sociologies of action in a particular perspective. Relations of power conceived not as domination, but as unequal capacities to influence others within an organization, or rather, a system of concrete action. Formalized in *L'Acteur et le système* by Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg (1977), this orientation has been a great success with all the specialists and actors of the organizations to whom it brings not only elements of analysis but also Methods and concepts linking the understanding of actors and transforming the system of concrete action.
- The central thesis underlying this research trend is that any actor in a system of concrete action, considered as a set of rules-structured games, possesses resources - albeit unequal - allowing him to construct zones of uncertainty Within the system which is always unstable, incomplete, open (because of the postulate of limited rationality). The social actor is thus conceived as a strategist (not an optimizer), that is, capable of making himself, at least partially, unpredictable to other actors, in order to maintain or increase his power. The dynamics of a system is therefore the result of the strategies of its actors: to know and confront them is to be able to understand change and eventually to change it in a certain sense.
- This research stream is carried out by means of field surveys which can be considered as interventions of a certain type: the sociologist can be called upon in the event of a problem in an organization. This one will need to observe and especially to gather the speech of the actors to reconstruct their strategies and understand the rules of the games of power and their zones of uncertainty. This implies gaining their confidence to produce knowledge that can be restored to the actors who allowed it to make its analysis.

Sociological intervention and social movements

- I. Another form of sociological intervention has been practiced for more than twenty years by the teams gathered around Alain Touraine. The perspective here consists of bringing out explanations, justifications, demands that can understand and legitimize a social movement from a situation, a localized group, a collective action, by means of interviews with groups composed of leaders or Of volunteers. Sociological intervention was conceived, following May-68, as the contribution of sociologists "committed" to the accompaniment and legitimation, in the action, of a historical actor capable of "producing the social" "To lead change", "to incarnate historicity" (Touraine, 1973).
- II. This is what the working class has done for more than a century in industrial societies, thanks in particular to its trade unions. This is what it no longer does, in the days of post-industrial society, as a result of the hold of technocracy and the advent of financial globalization.
- III. Have new social movements taken over? The study of feminist movements, students, antinuclearists, ecologists, etc., while highlighting new forms of mobilization, shows that these movements do not lead to a new overall conflict. Modernity thus becomes in crisis: rationalization and subjectivation diverge (Touraine, 1992).

Habitus and sociological “field”: a genetic structuralism

- I. Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) to solve the problem of the relations between structure and agent and to overcome the false oppositions between objective and subjective, social determination and individual action.
- II. The main concept allowing this transcendence is that of habitus, which designates all the dispositions to act that individuals inherit from their social trajectory - and in particular the conditions of their socialization - and which allows them to acquire a practical sense, Ability to act in the illusion of a free action adapted to its context. Thus the probability of "choosing" successful actions results from this practical sense eliminating all the alternatives that do not correspond to the acquired dispositions. This is what Bourdieu calls "the causality of the probable" (1974).
- III. Correspondence ("structural homology") between mental structures and social structures. This "theory" makes it possible to hold together the determinations (probabilistic) and the voluntary (adapted) actions, the social relations of class domination (resulting from previously objectified actions) and the struggles of classification (from internalized structures). The old actions thus form structures that influence the present actions and allow their reproduction in the future.
- IV. The field makes it possible to differentiate capital specific to success in a given field and particular habitus to face competition in this field (school, professional, artistic, sports, religious ...). This approach involves elucidating the genesis of this field, its rules and the structure of its positions. For it is the position that an individual occupies in a field that explains his "objective strategy" and makes it possible to verify the subjective relation he establishes because of his habitus. Thus, one can understand a posteriori (and sometimes anticipate, a priori) the trajectory of an individual in the field knowing his habitus and the structure of positions in this field.
- V. The last key concept of this current is that of capital. As in economics, capital is not only monetary, economic, but also "human." But, contrary to neo-classical postulates, the returns of these capital (cultural, social, symbolic) depend on their structure as much as on their volume. Some capital is decisive in a field, others are not. Some capital can be easily converted, others not. The objective of constituting a "general economy of practices" results from this concern to differentiate the forms of capital and their links with the various social fields

A sociology of configurations

- I. Another constructivist current is the posterity of the work of Norbert Elias (1897-1990). Its main originality is to break the boundaries between sociology, psychology and history. As a result of his work on the manuals of good manners and on the labels governing court societies (in particular the court of Versailles under Louis XIV), Elias advanced and defended the hypothesis of a process of civilization, The work in the West and, in parallel with the monopoly by states of legitimate violence, to increase the control of their emotions and their systematic repression for individuals (from top to bottom of the social scale) The rise of psychoanalysis).
- II. To analyze this process, it is necessary to break with any opposition between individual and society and to consider configurations constituting the bundles of relations (the nodes of the net) between individuals (meshes). In a remarkable research on a small English town (Norbert Elias and John Scotson, 1984), it has been shown how the configuration of the three sub-ensembles (middle-class bourgeois, workers of old stock and new workers) Of alliance (the first two) and of hostility (against the third). It is thanks to the consideration of history and temporalities that the authors have been able to show that a social configuration is indeed the crossed product of structural dynamics and individual trajectories.

A theory of structuring

- I. Sociologists who claim the work of the English sociologist Anthony Giddens can also be considered "constructivist" insofar as his theory of structuring rests on a central postulate, the duality of the structural, according to which "structural Not external to agents ... it is more internal than external to their activities ... both binding and enabling "(1987). Thus, society exists at two levels: that of social structures and that of representations of agents, which are regularly reinforced because of the routines and habits of the agents who thus "build" the structure through the reflexive control of action.
- II. The notion of reflexivity lies at the heart of this theory, which considers that modernity directly affects subjectivity and the relation to the world: "personal relations, sociability including loyalty and authenticity, become central to modernity in the same way That institutions integrating spatio-temporal distancing "(Giddens, 1984). It is a pity that this conceptual system is not linked to any empirical study: the assumption that globalization and its objective dimensions (capitalism, division of labor and international military order, questioning of nation states) A reinforcement of private sociability and reflective subjectivity, however interesting it may be, is not supported by survey data.

The social construction of reality

- I. We must mention the important posterity of the work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann devoted both to formulating a new theory of socialization and to proposing a sociology of knowledge (1966). The dialectic between the interiorization of the lived world, pre-reflexive knowledge and the externalization of this ordinary knowledge makes it possible to constitute a social stock of knowledge in each of them, which gives the possibility of adjusting actions to contexts (Bourdieu). This adjustment is made by means of classificatory schemes, reciprocal typifications allowing to construct benchmarks of action and to categorize the world lived. Thus "social reality" always appears to be doubly constructed: objectively, through experiments, and subjectively from categories, types, propositions, in short, the languages that put them into words. Relating elements of the phenomenology of Alfred Schütz (1899-1959) and the social behaviorism of George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), this book has enabled many sociologists to adopt an alternative socialization approach to Durkheim and to include the analysis of language and conversation in their research practice. It derives from both constructivism and the sociologies of identities.
- II. The term "constructivism" remains a convenient label for "capping" quite different currents. Of course, they all refuse the positivism of social determination and are not satisfied with a problematic wave of the actor. But the overcoming of the antinomies between "structures" and "agents" is not always entirely convincing: either it is carried out from the primacy of structures and manages to make the agent a "producer of social"; Or it tries to start from determined and active agents and it is difficult to reconstruct consistent structures.

Contemporary Political Science approaches

Neo-
functionalism

Inter-
governmentalism

Liberal Inter-
governmentalism

Neo-
institutionalism

Multi-level
Governance

Neo-functionalism

- I. Neo-functionalism was a popular theory of European integration in the 1950s and 1960s. The most prominent neo-functionalist writer was Ernst Haas in his book 'The Uniting of Europe' in 1958.
- II. The important question that neo functionalists attempt to ask is: how does cooperation in specific economic policy sectors lead to greater economic integration in Europe and then to wider political integration? The question is answered with the concept of spillover, which takes two forms.
 1. **Firstly, functional spillover is used to explain the way in which integration in one policy area, for example coal and steel, creates pressure for integration in further areas, such as currency exchange rates.**
 2. **Secondly, political spillover is used to explain the importance of supranational and subnational actors in the integration process, as they create further pressure for more integration to pursue their interests.** Pressure groups and political parties are also considered to be important actors. As a result of these processes of spillover, neo-functionalists see European integration as a self-sustaining process which will culminate in the creation of a new polity with its centre in Brussels.

Inter-governmentalism

Inter-governmentalism emphasises the role of the nation state in integration, and argues that the nation state is not becoming obsolete due to European integration.

- I. **Alan Milward, an inter-governmentalist writer, argued that the national governments of the member states were the primary actors in the process of European integration, and rather than being weakened by it as some of their sovereignty was delegated to the EU, they became strengthened by the process.**
- II. This is because in some policy areas it is in the member states' interest to pool sovereignty. Inter-governmentalists argue that they are able to explain periods of radical change in the EU as when the interests of the member states governments converge and they have shared goals, and periods of slower integration as when the governments' preferences diverge and they cannot agree.
- III. They continually emphasize the role of national governments and the bargaining between them in the integration process.

Liberal Inter-governmentalism

- I. Liberal inter-governmentalism is a development on the intergovernmental theory of European integration, established by Andrew Moravcsik in his 1998 book 'The Choice for Europe'.
- II. In the 1990s it was the dominant theory of European integration. Like inter-governmentalism, liberal inter-governmentalism emphasizes national governments as the key actors in the process of integration. However, it also incorporates the liberal model of preference formation, whereby national governments have a strong idea of what their preferences are and pursue them in bargaining with other member states.
- III. Liberal inter-governmentalists argue that the bargaining power of member states is important in the pursuit of integration, and package deals and side payments also occur in the process of making deals.
- IV. They see institutions as a means of creating credible commitments for member governments, that is, as a way of making sure that other governments that they make deals with will stick to their side of the bargain. Liberal inter-governmentalists consider supranational institutions to be of limited importance in the integration process, in contrast to neo-functionalists.

Neo-institutionalism

Neo-institutionalism emphasizes the importance of institutions in the process of European integration. New institutionalism developed over the course of the 1980s and 1990s to explain behaviour in the United States Congress, but has since been used to explain European integration. New institutionalism has three key strands: rational choice, sociological and historical.

- I. **Rational choice institutionalism** emphasizes the way in which actors pursue their individual preferences within the context of institutional rules. Rational choice institutionalists are interested in the way in which the preferences of actors in the integration process change as a result of changes in the institutional rules. An example of an institutional rule that constrains actors' behaviour is the ordinary legislative procedure, which affects how European actors can pursue their preferred policy outcomes. It is a close relative of liberal intergovernmentalism.
- II. **Sociological institutionalism** sees institutions in a slightly different way, emphasising broader norms and general rules and the way in which these shape the identities and preferences of actors in the integration process. Sociological institutionalists also pay particular attention to the culture of institutions and the socialisation of actors within them, and consider the patterns of communication and persuasion that occur during policy making and in the pursuit of integration.
- III. **Historical institutionalism** focuses on the effect of institutions over time, and how institutions can go on to constrain the actions of the actors who designed them. A key feature of historical institutionalism is path dependency, whereby decisions made about institutions in the past impact significantly on the outcomes of the future and are difficult to reverse. In 1996 Paul Pierson wrote specifically about path dependence in the EU, and emphasized the assumption that actors are not fully aware of what the consequences of their decisions at a particular point in time will be for their future action, and that their future behaviour is likely to be constrained by past choices.

Multi-level Governance

- I. Multi-level governance (MLG) is a much newer theory of European integration. MLG argues that policy making and integration in the EU is much too complicated to be explained by static integration theories. Key writers Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks defined MLG as the dispersion of authority across multiple levels of political governance. That is, they argue that over the last fifty years, authority and sovereignty has moved away from national governments in
- II. Europe, not just to the supranational level with the EU, but also to subnational levels such as regional assemblies and local authorities. They see policy making in the EU as uneven and frequently changing, and as such they highlight the limitations of other theories of European integration which disregard the significant numbers of different actors from all of the different levels of governance in Europe

Multi-level Governance II

- The very core of multilevel governance theory which is the notion of different territorial levels has been greatly contested. Some thinkers believe that the organization of levels implies a hierarchical order which cannot be possible in such a complex process. Others completely fail to distinguish between levels since public and private actors operate in interlocking roles both domestically and internationally.
- More specifically, Stubbs (2005) has accused the multilevel governance literature of "premature normativism", "abstract modelling", and "rehashed neo-pluralism". Furthermore, state-centric theories such as realism reject the idea of a supranational level with its own authority, considering international organizations mere tools which are established on the sole purpose of serving state interests. Nevertheless, Bache and Flinders crucially observe that "while multi-level governance remains a contested concept, its broad appeal reflects a shared concern with increased complexity, proliferating jurisdictions, the rise of non-state actors, and the related challenges to state power" (Stubbs: 2005: 68).



European Governance in International Relations and Social Sciences

Second section

European Governance and Social Sciences

Realist approach in
international relations

Liberal-idealist approach in
international relations

Functionalist/interdependence
approach in international
relations

Hegemonic approach in
international relations

Social Constructivism approach

Realist approach in international relations

- I. For realists, the behavior of states and other actors on both the international and domestic levels of politics is informed by immutable “laws”. States regularly act as rational beings that impose their views, increase their power and extend their influence culturally, economically, politically, scientifically as well as through religious ties or influences.
- II. According to Stanley Hoffmann, they are subject to the necessity of calculating means and understanding diplomatic constellations. The study of diplomatic constellations comprise three objective and three subjective questions. The positive questions concern the need to comprehend the diplomatic field, the configuration of power relations in this field and the techniques of warfare. The subjective questions are of an “ideological-political” nature.
- III. At stake here are decisions to engage in mutual recognition with other states or not, the articulation of the direction and goals of foreign policy and the streamlining of these goals and directions with those of domestic policy. All these consideration need to be framed in studies and topologies (typically multi- or bi-polar) of international systems (organized sets, the identity of which turn on the competition between the units within the set). The possibility of an international and/or European order exist insofar as it would be created by the states themselves: “Sovereign states freely and voluntarily adhere to agreements and rules which maintain the dynamics of interstate conflict in a peaceful setting. However, the establishment of perpetual peace is unimaginable because of the sovereignty, ambitions, inequality and mutual distrust of states that feed a constant security dilemma”.
- IV. Andrew Moravcsik accordingly suggests European integration is essentially a strategy of national administrations and governments to achieve their goals with recourse to options that the integration process offers.

Modèle de
Morgenthau

Modèle de
Carr

Modèle de
Hoffmann &
Keohane

Modèle de
Bull

Inter-governmentalism and European Governance

- I. **Inter-governmentalism was developed in the mid-1960s and initially proposed by Stanley Hoffmann. It suggests that national governments control the level and speed of European integration.** The theory proposed the Logic of Diversity, which 'set limits to the degree which the 'spill-over' process can limit the freedom of action of the governments...the logic of diversity implies that on vital issues, losses are not compensated by gains on other issues'.
- II. **Any increase in power at supranational level, he argues, results from a direct decision by governments. He believed that integration, driven by national governments, was often based on the domestic political and economic issues of the day.** The theory rejects the concept of the spill-over effect that Neo-functionalism proposes. He also rejects the idea that supranational organizations are on an equal level (in terms of political influence) as national governments.

Liberal-idealist approach in international relations

- I. The "liberal-idealist" approach focuses instead on interdependence and convergence of state interests. International relations and political regimes are the result of religious, cultural, economic and political cooperation between states, businesses, non-governmental organizations from civil society and even between individuals.
- II. These multiple transnational relationships, be they horizontal or vertical, hierarchical or equal, bilateral or multilateral or not, suggest states and governments are merely actors among others in an international system of joint political decision-making.
- III. According to James Rosenau, the international system has become more complicated by the preponderance of two political and socioeconomic subsystems that are increasingly at odds. The one is based on the primacy of relationships that states develop on the international stage and resorts to categories of analysis and action inherited from the Westphalian system (the rule of law and the sovereignty of the state). The other is dominated by non-state actors (NGOs, companies, individuals, social protest movements, etc.) which by the nature of their actions and objectives and the creation of autonomous information networks and exchanges – be they religious, cultural, economic or just aspirational – pose a threat to the supremacy of states and undermine national legislative sovereignty.
- IV. These authors also remain convinced that the progress of political liberalism, that is, of the rule of law, human rights and basic freedoms and democracy, requires states to incorporate specific and autonomous demands of civil society into their strategies and encourage them to forge new alliances and create new modes of action and legitimation. The European Union and its governance would be one of the best illustrations.
- V. Yet, as Pierre de Senarclens reminds one, resistance to trans-nationalization and interdependence remain pertinent and deserve further study. As he puts it, the "focus on transnational realities and the interdependence between societies tends to minimize the authority of the state and tend to confuse the regulatory power of states with that of other international actors, including individuals. It neglects the analysis of conflicts of power and the relations of domination and hegemony that inform international politics and shows a lack of understanding of the political structures that underlie new conditions of exchange and communication

Functionalist/interdependence approach in international relations

- I. The emphasis is on interdependence and cooperation, considering that contemporary international relations do not correspond to the conflictual and interstate model of realistic theories.
- II. Since the Second World War, the dynamics of modernization, initiated by the Industrial Revolution, have seen a new impetus driven by the development of technology and the growth of international trade. While this dynamic contributed to building a complex network of interdependencies between different societies and has revealed new types of international players, it has nevertheless generated new demands and needs in our societies and revealed value systems based on economic and social well-being. The development model, gradually adopted by both industrialized and Third World countries, has imposed new social and economic tasks on the State, which has shown itself less and less capable of satisfying these new requirements on its own.
- III. New supranational, transnational and sub-national forces emerged on the international stage and limited the capacities of States, as evidenced, for example, by the development of multinational enterprises and the multiplication of alternative networks and channels of decision makings
- IV. The State had to open itself more and more to exchanges with the outside world and thus to engage in a growing interdependence, the main consequence of which is a restriction of its autonomy. It would therefore become increasingly difficult to distinguish foreign policy from internal politics and to explain the international behavior of a state in purely strategic and military terms.
- V. The pragmatic management of economic and social interests could have spill-over effects in the political sphere, but it was not sufficient for the development of the European Union: the establishment of supranational institutions was necessary, as much as the will of the Governments concerned. The role and influence of economic, political and administrative elites in the process of European integration must be emphasized here.
- VI. The unequal power between traditional actors and new players in international relations creates an asymmetrical interdependence that can not lead to an equitable sharing of benefits.

Modèle de
Woolf &
Mitrany

Modèle de
Haas

Modèle de
Kehoane &
Nye

Modèle de
Brailard

Hegemonic approach in international relations

- I. A fourth approach to international relations evidently emerges here, one that borrows much from Marxist analyses of social and economic relations in capitalist societies.
- II. This approach aims to unmask the hegemony and dependence constellations at work in international relations and within political systems. "Global" and "European" governance are telling instances of the hegemonic constellations stressed here.
- III. This mode of critical inquiry highlights especially two types of hegemonic patterns in current international relations and domestic political systems: Cultural and normative hegemonies that more or less surreptitiously underpin evident economic and political hegemonies; hegemonic governance systems in international legal and financial areas such as the IMF, OECD and the European Union, on the one hand, and hegemonic jurisdictions such as those of international courts and arbitration institutions, on the other.
- IV. These "governancial" (as opposed to "governmental") and jurisdictional hegemonic developments have especially become evident in Europe since the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and they increasingly undermine or limit the scope of democratic controls over political decision-making

Modèle de
Marx

Modèle de
Gramsci

Modèle de
Gilpin

Modèle de
Gunder Franck
& Prebisch

Social Constructivism approach

- I. Social Constructivism is a recent import into European Union studies, yet as Chris Brown states, it is the "fastest growing oppositional movement within IR theory" (2005:48).
- II. Traditionally, International Relations theories can be classified in two categories; 'Rationalist' and 'Reflectivist,' with theories such as Liberalism and Realism typically being seen as Rationalist while progressive theories such as post-modernism, feminism and Critical Theory form the basis of Reflectivism. Rationalism is the belief that the world can be understood and explained through the exercise of human reason, based on assumptions about its rational structure (Heywood: 2007: 44). Whereas Reflectivism focuses on the interpretation of events rather than empirical data (Smith: 2001: 42).
- III. Social Constructivism arises out of the view that neither of these two categories produces a complete method for understanding the International System. Social Constructivism sought to be distinct by not only finding a middle way between Reflectivism and Rationalism, but as Rosamond states, by being more of an ontology than a theory. In this way it seeks to give a position of the nature of social reality, and as Rosamond continues, it follows that there are many Constructivism with Rationalist theories (2006:131).

Social Constructivism approach II

- I. An early Constructivist was Nicholas Onuf, he believed that the world in which we live is a "world of our making," that things are a certain way because that is how we perceive them, we do not live in world that has been predetermined in advance by non-human forces (Onuf: 1989).
- II. Alexander Wendt echoes this view; he developed the 'thin approach' of Social Constructivism. His key belief is that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt: 1992) and that in fact states are actively involved in constructing anarchy. He believes that anarchy cannot be treated as 'given,' it is not something that can condition state action without itself being conditioned by state action (Brown: 2005: 49). Wendt further argues that the possibility exists that within an anarchic framework norms can emerge (Wendt: 1999).
- III. Jeffrey Checkel developed the 'thick approach' of Social Constructivism. He argues that power is created by everyday actions. He further argues that Constructivism questions the materialism and methodological individualism on which much contemporary scholarship has been built (Checkel: 1998).
- IV. Despite their criticisms of rationalist theories, Wendt and Checkel do see the use of Rational research methods as essential with regards to the study of the EU. Checkel states that "constructing European institutions is a multi-faceted process, with both Rationalist and Sociological toolkits needed to unpack and understand it" (2001: 50).

Social Constructivism approach III

- I. Constructivists argue that they are best placed to study European Integration as a process. This is because they are predisposed to think about how humans interact in way that produce structures (Rosamond: 2006: 130). They also believe that as Constructivism takes the middle ground, they are able to "engage in meaningful conversations" with both Rationalists and Reflectivists (Risse & Wiener: 1999).
- II. Social Constructivists such as Wendt believe that interests are socially constructed rather than pre-given. As Brown states:
- III. "The central insight of constructivist thought can perhaps best be conveyed by the notion that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between 'brute facts' about that world, which remain true, independent of human action, and 'social facts' which depend for their existence on socially established conventions." (2005: 49)
- IV. Social Constructivists are interested in how collective understandings and identities emerge; they argue that we must investigate the ways in which identities such as 'European Citizenship' are constructed through the use of language, the development of ideas and the establishment of norms, in this way, identities are never fixed, they are simply constructed (Rosamond: 2006: 130). The view that the EU develops through the establishment of norms rather than changing as a result of external factors such as the Cold War and increasing globalisation is the core of Social Constructivism and clearly contrasts with Rationalist views which place great emphasis on these external factors.
- V. Following on from this, Constructivists believe that it is through the internalisation of these norms that actors acquire their identities and establish what their interests are. Rosamond refers to this as the "constitutive effect of norms," this is the way in which European-level norms, ideas and discourses penetrate into the various national polities which make up the EU (2006: 131).
- VI. Social Constructivism examines the way in which institutions such as the European Union act as arenas for communication and persuasion (Rosamond: 2006: 131). As Jupille et al. (2003) state, "Constructivists emphasise a process of interaction between agents and structures."

Social Constructivism approach IV

- I. Social Constructivism claims to occupy the middle ground, as Risse & Wiener state, "Constructivism shares with Rational choice an epistemological commitment to truth seeking, and the belief that causal generalisation in the form of middle range theories is possible" (Risse & Wiener: 1999). However, it is criticised for its failure to occupy this middle ground without straying to one side. For example, Steve Smith sees Constructivism to be "far more 'Rationalist' than 'Reflectivist'" (1999: 683). Indeed, Smith believes that Constructivism will split into two main camps, one more Rationalist, the other more Reflectivist, this he states, is due to "fundamentally different epistemological assumptions" (Smith: 1999: 690).
- II. This difficulty in clearly defining the 'middle way' offered by Social Constructivism leads to a situation where it is difficult to see clearly what Social Constructivism might offer to the European discourse, despite each individual model offering sometimes challenging ontologies.
- III. Moravcsik clearly identifies this weakness, he states that Social Constructivism has "contributed far less to our empirical and theoretical understanding of European [studies] ...certainly far less than existing alternatives" (Moravcsik: 1999: 670).

European Governance and Social Sciences

Governance in
political science

Governance in
legal approach

Governance and
Europeanization

Governance and
Democratization

Governance and Political science

The use of the term "governance" beyond multiple adjectives that are attached to it ("corporate" , "multi-level," etc.) in political science is inseparably linked to the globalization of economies, the impact of international law on domestic legal systems and the legislative and bureaucratic Europeanization of European states and societies. It is important to take a closer look at this substitution of "government" by "governance".

Governance and Political science II

- I. The latter aims to facilitate the effective exercise of power, on the one hand, and the integrity and accountability those who hold power, on the other, be they public or private authorities. Governance seeks to increase efficiency and transparency of the management of collective resources, typically through partnerships between the state, business and civil society. It accordingly gives rise to new modes of interaction and political participation.
- II. Typically involved would be institutions and agencies with little or no democratic accountability that nevertheless contribute to the articulation and enunciation of significant policy framework and indeed policies.

Governance and Political science III

- I. Governance bodies invariably reflect modes of interdependence between public institutions and private agency networks. At work in all of this is the insistence that governmental functions need not be directly subject to the authority of accountable government in a sovereign state
- II. Governance, however, does not quite constitute a 'privatization' of political activity, but it does give rise to significant levels of competition and complementarity between public institutions and private organizations. Such competition could also exist among public institutions themselves, especially at different levels of government (national, regional, local).
- III. In sum, governance evidently presents itself as an alternative to the political and economic regulation by classic constitutional democratic nation and welfare states that traditionally relied almost exclusively on prosecution to secure effective government. This kind of governance has undoubtedly become a key characteristic of the European socio-political landscape.

Governance and Political science IV

- I. Governance in Europe would typically comprise the normative regulation of production processes, on the one hand, and the frameworks of values through which political authority is defined and constrained, on the other, both within the European Union and outside it.
- II. The Council of Europe and the European Convention Human evidently reflect elements of broader “governancial” constraints on political authority in Europe that goes beyond the boundaries of the European Union.
- III. More specifically, European Governance would entail the formation of public policy frameworks, the grounds of legitimacy of which typically exceed those associated with traditional constitutional democracies. These news grounds of legitimation are underpinned by a range of deliberative, procedural, normative and communicative practices with regard to which the “central” authorities such as the European Union and the Council of Europe are evidently not the only actors (and questions arise as to how much “central authority” still prevails here).
- IV. "European governance" would for this reason also be a term that refer to the polycentric nature of the European Union with its multiple configurations of political, economic and social regulation

The models of decision-making in European Union


Community' method

- ❖ As a general rule, EU decisions are taken by means of the 'Community' method involving the use of the ordinary legislative procedure, as defined in Article 294 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
- ❖ The Community method is characterized by
- ❖ the sole right of the European Commission to initiate legislation;
- ❖ the co-decision power between the Council and the European Parliament, and
- ❖ the use of qualified majority voting in Council.

Intergovernmental method

- ❖ It contrasts with the intergovernmental method of operation used in decision-making, mainly on Common Foreign and Security Policy and aspects of police and judicial cooperation. This method has the following salient features:
- ❖ the Commission's right of initiative is shared with the EU countries or confined to specific areas of activity;
- ❖ the European Council, explicitly mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty, often plays a key role;
- ❖ the Council generally acts unanimously;
- ❖ •the European Parliament has a purely consultative role.

Internal tensions in the European Governance



New disturbing elements concerning the European Governance between 2010 and 2015 with the Economical crisis

National and regional
responsiveness of economic
issues



New rules for
coordination, and
economical convergence



Increased and wider government
control over European Union
policy without the respect of the
European Treaties



Inherent challenges
to European
Governance



Governance and legal approach

- I. Recent legal theoretical literature on the self-regulation of systems of “governance” through various modes of private law and private law institutions, on the one hand, and the outsourcing of public powers to private or semi-private agencies, on the other, concern key features of the erosion of national state sovereignties concomitant to globalization described above.
- II. Key examples of this literature pivot on the observation that state-regulation of public relations and public services in Europe is increasingly displaced by non-state institutions of private governance. At issue here are not only institutions such as sports and professional associations that “regulate” their commerce firstly by means of internal regulatory procedures and rules and ultimately by private law institutions like contract and delict (tort).

Governance and legal approach II

- I. The same turn towards private law based regulation is also evident in the “commercial” regulation of service provision by companies that emerge from the privatization of former state run enterprises. A case in point is the network of business relations that resulted from the privatization and dissolution of British Rail in the 1990s.
- II. Out of the single state run enterprise emerged about over 100 separate units, not counting the many more parties involved in the outsourcing of maintenance services. The aim of this dissolution, in the words of Mark Freedland, was “to replace internal command relationships within the old British Rail by contractual relationships between free-standing autonomous bodies.”
- III. The spirit of developments such as these is nevertheless not that interested parties involved are intent on or prone to litigate when someone does not stick to the rules, but rather that everyone will naturally comply with the rules in their own interest and would be willing to subject rare cases of intractable disputes to arbitration or disciplinary procedures that are already embodied in the terms of affiliation that condition membership in these associations.

Governance and legal approach III

- I. Judicialisation of politics part and parcel of this process and there is a wealth of scholarly reflection on the way the Court of Justice of the European Union has become one of the principal executors of key policies of European market integration.
- II. It is important to note that some judiciaries have also realized that a line should be drawn somewhere if a whole sale forfeiture of essential elements of democratic legitimacy is to be avoided. The decisions of the Israeli and Indian Supreme Courts that respectively struck down privatizations of prisons and police units have become beacons of resistance among constitutional judiciaries to this trend of governance through private law and privatization.

Governance and legal approach IV

- I. Legal theoretical reflection on these developments tend to divide into two camps. On the one hand, theorists who – under the influence of Niklas Luhmann – consider functional differentiation as a key ingredient of postmodern conceptions of legal legitimacy. These theorists seriously question the legitimacy of legal systems that pivot on the modern triad of a set of fundamental constitutional principles, centralized modes of democratic legislation that give effect to these constitutional principles, and a public administration that executes legislation.
- II. For them, such highly centralised systems of law that ultimately pivot on a number of key Enlightenment norms – individual liberty, equality before the law, integrity of the person – on the basis of which all corners of sovereign territories are governed from “afar” are insensitive to the specifics of legal environments that require the greater sophistication and environmental sensitivity (in the system theoretical sense of the phrase) of localised law-making. They therefore invariably endorse the great transformation of government into governance.

Governance and legal approach IV

- I. Configurations of public-private governance or completely private modes of governance would seem to meet the criteria of functional differentiation and environmental sensitivity that they consider essentials of postmodern legal legitimacy.
- II. A pronounced modernist resistance to this functional differentiation of law-making procedures is nevertheless also prominent in contemporary theory. Most remarkable in this regard is the description of the transformation of government into localised forms of governance as clear signs of a re-feudalization that threatens to destroy the normative legacy of modernity.

Governance and legal approach III

- I. The description of the contemporary scene of law in terms of two opposite trajectories, quasi-feudal localization, on the one hand, and trans-nationalisation, on the other, would seem to hit upon paradox, but the appearance of paradox can be easily dispelled. The normative principles on which trans-nationalisation turns in a context of global capitalism – privatization, market liberalization – are exactly those norms that promote localized governance with little or no democratic accountability. The minimization of democratic accountability may even be considered as an aspiration itself under these circumstances, considering the way democratic accountability is always to some extent linked to political concerns with minimum levels of social equality that often stand in the way of market liberalization.
- II. It is instructive to note how the combination of these three key elements of market liberalization, trans-nationalisation and judicialisation have become a key feature of recent developments in European law. In 2007 and 2008, the Court of Justice of the European Union passed a series of judgments – generally known as the Laval and Viking Quartet – that prioritized market liberalization over social security considerations (that were well entrenched in Member State collective bargaining agreements). In the process the Court not only presented itself as one of the most conspicuous agents of judicial politics and policy making in the world today, but also contributed to elements of trans-nationalisation that had not been foreseen in the European Treaties, considering the way these decisions evidently interfered with Member State competences that had not been transferred to the European Union.
- III. As Catherine Barnard puts the matter bluntly: “The essence of the criticism [levelled against] Viking is that the Court used the single market provisions to reach deep into an area of national law, an area over which the European Union has ... no competence to (re)regulate.” Singling out a short series of judgments that were passed within the span of a short period of time does of course not do justice to the full spectrum of CJEU adjudication, but it should be noted that the Court would still appear to be comfortable enough with this line of judgments not to have felt the need to repudiate it expressly since then.

Democratization and Europeanization at the source of European governance



Europeanization and social sciences

- I. Trans-nationalisation is a key aspect of the "Great Transformation" of government into governance – to use the apt term with which Karl Polanyi described the epochal transformation of early modern economics.
- II. Trans-nationalisation surely goes to the heart of the “great transformation” of late- or post-modern economies, both in Europe and elsewhere, but it is surely not constrained to economic developments.
- III. The political systems of European Union Member States and of the Council of Europe have been going through a very specific process of trans-nationalisation in recent years and decades, namely, “Europeanization.”
- IV. This term, which is the subject of a vast literature, denotes the combined effect of a number of developments that include a historical process (the exportation of European authority and social and cultural norms of a predominantly social-liberal origin); a cultural diffusion process (diffusion of cultural norms, ideas and identities); an institutional adjustment process (adaptation of domestic institutions as a result of direct or indirect pressures concomitant to accession to the European Union); and in a convergence of public policies through implementation of European directives.

Europeanisation and social sciences II

To sum up, **Europeanisation concerns an overarching political project aimed at a united and politically stronger Europe, the combined effect of which is a normative system, a model of organization and political adaptation, a place of learning and political socialization that is constantly at work in the practices and structures of both the so-called producers of the system (the European Union and Council of Europe) and its receivers (the elites and societies of the Member States of the European Union and other European states that are inescapably part of this process).**

However a series of questions arises at this level:

Research questions addressed to Europeanization II

Can one assess the process of Europeanisation beyond the implementation of European directives and the legal and economic institutional compliance of Member States with the rules of the European Union by taking into account cultural factors (also including deep religious and philosophical orientations)?

What role do economic and political elites – national and European – play in this process of Europeanization?

Are they the key figures in the rise of a neo-corporatism?

Are the key agents of representative democracy – citizens, political parties and parliaments – adequately aware of the “Great Transformation”?

How do they understand their roles in this new systemic configuration and integration of the supranational and intergovernmental?

Is this Europeanization effectively producing a new form of political pluralism (in both the American and European sense) ?

Research questions addressed to Europeanization III

Is one moving towards a new understanding of legitimacy that is based on the exercise of consociational democracy and the assertion of the multiplicity of social actors that requires new instruments of cooperation, consensus and arbitration?

Is this emerging consociational democracy the complementary and (merely) compensatory counter-side of a rising neo-corporatism that increasingly isolates itself from the demands of representative democracy?

Is the rise of arbitral dispute resolution and disciplinary practices the signal of an increasing judicialisation of politics?

Can one add to this the marginalisation of penal and prosecution systems and procedures associated with republican conceptions of popular sovereignty?

How do all of this relate to – or what does it mean for – the normative aspiration of equality on which the ideal of popular sovereignty pivots?

Research questions addressed to Europeanization IV

How would the dispersion of power linked to the rise of governance and the spread of Europeanization ensure the distribution of equal benefits and burdens among citizens?


If not, how else might the great transformation of national government into trans-national governance sustain adequate levels of legitimacy and social cohesion among citizens?

Or will the wave of governance and Europeanization simply sweep away the liberal- individualist expression of citizenship and replace it with communitarian and collective identities devoid of democratic participation and devoid of institutions that ensure such participation?

Does “political pluralism” ultimately entail the effective replacement of government by governance?

Will it then, instead of reflecting an appropriate and just concern with social pluralism, ultimately lead to obscure privatizations of political activity that disperses public and moral accountability while consolidating and insulating from scrutiny the core elements of decision-making?

Main intellectual origins of the processes of European integration



Competitive European integration projects

Negative
Integration
Model

Free Trade
Model

Model of
values

Positive
integration
model

Security
Model

Stabilization
model

Federalism and European Governance

Federalism

Federations

Confederations

Leagues

Unions

Asymmetric
Federalism

Federalism and European Governance II

- I. The classic account of European integration derives from Federalism' (Hill and Smith, 2005, p.20). Federalism is an often misunderstood theoretical perspective and is often thought of as an ideology or political philosophy rather than a theory. Its meaning is understood in terms of the situation in which it is being used. In the case of the European Union, it is unusual as it transcends state and state structure.
- II. Wiener and Diez (2004, p25) use the commonly heard 'ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' to describe the idea of Federalism in Europe. It is a complex mix of institutions, structures and procedures which arguably is looking more federal. The federal school was constructed as 'a way of bringing together previously separate, autonomous or territorial units to constitute a new form of union' (Wiener and Diez 2004, p26). The original state was autonomous, sovereign, centralised and indivisible. After the War of Independence, America created the first Federal state and challenged the traditional idea of state. Federalism comes from the Latin foedus, literally meaning the act of forming of a covenant, contract of bargain (Wiener and Diez 2004 p28). This means that over centuries this has evolved to mean the 'voluntary union of entities, be they persons, a people, communities or states' (Wiener and Diez 2004 p28).

Federalism and European Governance III

- I. Federalism is now only really used in context to the European Union as the European Union reflects its ideas to a greater extent than anywhere else in the world, thus it is often criticised for being too Eurocentric. It is also teleological in nature, believing that total integration will be eventually achieved; however it ignores the potential resistance of states or other forms of integration which do not result in a super state. The Federalist theories are rooted in political philosophy so they are more normative than analytical and often focuses more on why states should form a union rather than why states would voluntarily surrender their sovereignty (Hill and Smith 2005, p21). Even in the closest example to the Federalist model, the EU- the voluntary union has not been fully achieved.
- II. However, the European Union's perceived need for an effective foreign policy remains the strongest argument for federalism. Federalism is frequently criticised for being ambiguous, leading to it being hard to understand; it is often used to describe both the 'process of political unification and the diffusion of power within a unified state, or the process of disaggregation' (Weiner and Diez 2004, p29). Its ambiguity has led to much misunderstanding through different interpretations, in Britain the meaning is very different to that of some of the continental European states leading to disagreement during the Maastricht European Council in 1991 (Rosamond 2000, p24).
- III. Some thinkers believe that Federalist thinking flared up during and after the Second World War but did not have a great or lasting impact. O'Neill (Rosamond 2000, p29) argued that 'the federalist prospectus barely dented the European political establishment' but the ongoing influence on the workings of the EU show this is not the case. Ben Rosamond (2000 p30) argues that the biggest mistake of federalism is to advocate the reproduction of state organisational structure at a European level. He claims this is unachievable because it creates distance between the governed and governing and the potential for interstate rivalries.

Europeanisation I

Kevin Featherstone spotlights four dimensions of Europeanization:

- I. A historical process (the export of European authority and Western social and cultural norms),
- II. A process of cultural dissemination (dissemination of cultural norms, ideas, identities),
- III. An institutional adaptation process (domestic adaptation to direct or indirect pressures emanating from EU accession),
- IV. Policies (deliberate system of principles to guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes)

Europeanisation II

Robert Ladrech : « *a incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economics dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making* » (Ladrech 1994 : 69).

- I. The interest of this definition is to establish the possible points of impact of the European Union on public action at national level, by insisting on new organizational structures, and to show the importance of top-down dynamics) Induced by Europeanisation.
- II. However, this definition is insufficient for two reasons: the nature of the impact created by the EU is not specified and the feedback effects (bottom-up logic) are excluded (Palier and Surel 2007: introduction p. 35).
- III. Moreover, François Bafail and Timm Beichelt stress that this definition represents too limited a perspective for the study of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, insofar as these countries are not only aware of a reformulation of the organizational logic of their national policies , But also a reconfiguration of their identities. (Bafail and Beichelt 2008, p.18).

Europeanisation III

« the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, social institutions associated with political problems solving that formalize interactions among actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules. » (Cowles, Caporaso, Risse 2001: introduction p. 3).

Europeanisation IV

J. P. Olsen :

- I. Europeanisation is not a single process, a phenomenon sui generis. Different phenomena, which are complementary and not competing, are linked to the concept of Europeanization:
- II. Changes in external territorial borders, ie enlargement of the EU,
- III. The development of governance institutions at European level,
- IV. The interpenetration of national and sub-national governance systems (and their adaptation to European standards),
- V. The export of European governance beyond European territory,
- VI. A political project aiming at a united and politically stronger Europe.

Europeanisation V

- I. In the academic literature there is another kind of Europeanization called "Enlargement Europeanization" (Axt, Milososki and Schwarz 2007) or "Europeanization in the East" (Börzel 2006 in: Kutter and Trappmann, p.
- II. Indeed, it is necessary to distinguish the Europeanization of the former Western European Member States from that of the new Member States / former candidates from Central and Eastern Europe.
- III. EU member states, if they have to adapt their institutions and policies to European requirements ("downloading"), can in turn influence European governance ("uploading").
- IV. Europeanisation is an interactive process in which the Member States affected by the process of European integration are at the same time the actors who initiate and define the process, which is not the case for the Central and Eastern European States .

Europeanisation VII

- I. *« Processes of a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, style, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.» (Radaelli 2002)*
- II. This definition reflects the cognitive dimension of Europeanization.
- III. It characterizes Europeanisation as a process to be explained and not as a result to be measured (Palier and Surel 2007: introduction p.37).
- IV. According to Heather Grabbe, this definition is relevant to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe because it underlines the importance of change in political behavior, which is a useful and necessary means to distinguish the effects of Europeanisation from other processes At work in the post-communist countries (Grabbe 2003: 305-327).

Europeanisation VIII :Transformation Model »

- I. The system is transformed by the effect of Europeanization, which is one of the causes of domestic transformations. Two additional elements are added to Europeanisation: globalization and the regional (sub-national) dimension.
- II. These three elements form the territorial contexts: the national space is thus anchored in regional, European and transnational processes.
- III. In this model, actors, institutions, norms and ideas at the national level form the systemic contexts and interact with the European scale. As a result of this interactive and complex process, the national political system is transformed to Time 1, which can then be compared to Time 0. Thus the "Transformation Model" considers Europeanisation as a phenomenon that acts Two levels: the State and the EU.
- IV. The process of political transformations starts from the state and the European dimension conditions the context in which the process takes place (Beichelt 2008: pp. 38-43).

Democratization and European Governance

- I. Early studies on the process of democratization in the countries of Mediterranean and Latin American countries assume that exogenous factors play no role or only a marginal role in endogenous political changes (O'Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead 1986, Linz and Stepan 1986, Diamond, Linz, Lipset 1989).
- II. After the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, authors in the 1990s reassessed the international dimension of the democratization process (Huntington 1991, Pridham 1994, Whitehead 2001).
- III. Some even argue that the changes that have occurred in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe depend more on international policies to promote democracy than on internal dynamics (Bonanate 2000).

Democratization and European Governance II

According to Roberto Di Quirico and Elena Baracani, academic literature five external dynamics that act on the Democratization process:

- I. Contagion (the dissemination of democratic rules and practices as a model to follow),
- II. Socialization (the process of internalisation of democratic rules),
- III. Embedding (the anchoring of democracy in an international context),
- IV. The conditionality (profits drawn to fulfill certain conditions)
- V. And control (imposition of democratic rules through the control of political institutions) (Di Quirico 2005: introduction p.17).

Democratization and European Governance III

- I. As regards the role of the EU in the democratization of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there are differences in the academic literature. Some argue that the EU has played an important role in their democratic consolidation. Paul J. Kubicek considers that the EU, by imposing a rigorous program based on political conditionality, has overcome the reluctant democratizers such as Latvia, Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, Morocco Or Turkey (Kubicek 2003: 214).
- II. Other writers continue to stress the importance of internal factors in the process of democratization. According to Liborio Mattina, the more or less strong influence of the European Union and the ability of states to adapt their institutions depend on the historical and political heritage of the countries and the reforming (or not) attitude of the elites (Mattina, In Di Qirico 2005: pp. 25-34)

Democratization and European Governance IV

- I. Theories of regime change distinguish two phases in the process of democratization: "democratic transition" and "democratic consolidation".
- II. The "transition" begins when the non-democratic regime begins to collapse, and continues with the establishment of a new constitution and democratic structures.
- III. "Democratic consolidation" is a longer process (two or even three decades in some cases) and broader, involving the institutionalization of the new democracy, the internalization of rules and procedures and the dissemination of democratic values in the " Political arena and in civil society. The phases of "transition" and "consolidation" must be distinguished qualitatively, but may overlap in time.
- IV. As regards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it is clear that their "transition" was complete when they began the accession negotiations in 1998 for the Luxembourg group and in 2000 for the Helsinki group. Fulfilled the democratic criteria of Copenhagen and had "stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, democracy, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities", which implied that they would have begun their "democratic consolidation" ".

Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria) 1993

- ❖ The Treaty on European Union sets out the conditions (Article 49) and principles (Article 6(1)) to which any country wishing to become an EU member must conform.
- ❖ Certain criteria must be met for admission. These criteria (known as the Copenhagen criteria) were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995.

They are:

- I. stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- II. a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU;
- III. ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the 'acquis'), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
- IV. For EU accession negotiations to be launched, a country must satisfy the first criterion.

Democratization and European Governance V

- I. Relations between the EU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe began during their 'transition' with the signing of association agreements, but the EU had no direct influence on the constitutional choices of the Member States , Even if it symbolically embodied a model of liberal democracy to follow.
- II. The EU has more directly influenced the democratization of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe since the mid-1990s, when countries formally applied for membership and the EU began to apply democratic and Rigorously monitor compliance with the Copenhagen criteria ("Annual Regular Reports"). The interactions between democratization and Europeanisation, between "democratic consolidation" and accession to the EU, intensified between 1998/2000 and 2004, after the opening of negotiations with the candidate countries.
- III. The EU's objective was for the candidate countries to be "consolidated democracies" at the time of accession. However, "democratic consolidation" is a long and complex process, which was not completely completed in all the post-communist states at the time of accession in 2004



Neo-functionalism & New institutionalism : Two dominant approaches to understanding European Governance

Third section

Neo-functionalism


- I. Neo-functionalism was developed in the second half of the 1950s and is the first, 'classical' grand theory/narrative of European integration. It is a theory of regional integration, building on the work of Ernst B. Haas, an American political scientist and Leon Lindberg, also an American political scientist.
- II. Jean Monnet's approach to European integration, which aimed at integrating individual sectors in hopes of achieving spill-over effects. The core of Neo-functionalism is the use of the concept of 'spill-over'. The process of 'spill-over' refers to situations when an initial decision by governments to place a certain sector under the authority of central institutions creates pressures to extend the authority of the institutions into neighboring areas of policy, such as currency exchange rates, taxation, and wages. This core claim meant that European integration is self-sustaining: 'spill-over' triggers the economic and political dynamics driving further cooperation.

Functionalism Vs Neofunctionalism

- | | |
|--|---|
| I. Integration by allocating functions to the scale of government in which they will be most useful. | I. To create institutions that drive the integration further by inertia even if it was not originally intended. |
| II. A separate institutional organisation performing their functions. | II. A complete shift to one new center as a result of “new political community”. |
| III. Integration with an end result | III. Integration as a process |

Key Thinkers

- Ernst B. Haas, “The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces” (1958).
- Another book, “Beyond the Nation-State”(1964).
- Leon Lindberg, “The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration”(1963).



Key Features

SPIILLOVER

LOYALTY

TECHNOCRATIC
AUTOMATICITY

Spillover

- Lindberg's definition

"A situation in which a given action related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action and so forth"

- The notion of spillover rests on two logics:

- Expansive Logic
- Deepening Logic (ECSC to EMU)

Spillover

Functional

- Economies of the states are interconnected
- Envisaged by Jean Monnet (Coal and steel community)

Political

- Arises from the 'pluralist' nature of West European societies.
- Interest are better served by seeking supranational rather than national solutions.

Cultivated

- Supranational institutes taking "integrating initiatives".
- Removal of non-tariff barrier in the union by the commission which led to signing of SEA

Technical

- Disparities in standards will cause states to rise(or sink) to the level of the state with tightest(or loosest) regulations.
- Greece and Portugal- Environmental Controls


Schmitter's adaptation of Spillover

spillover	Increase in scope and level of the actors' commitment
spill- around	Increase in scope with the level of authority constant
buildup	Increase in decisional autonomy and capacity of the central institutions without expansion into new areas
retrench	Increase of the level of joint deliberations withdrawing the institutions
muddle about	Decrease of the actual capacity of regional bureaucracies to allocate values allowing them debate on a variety of issues
spill-back	Retreat on level and scope of authority returning to status quo prior to integration
encapsulate	Respond to crisis by marginal modifications
Schmitter Ph. (1971) " A Revised Theory of European Integration" in L.N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold (eds), Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press)	


Loyalty

- *“Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing nation states ” –Haas(1968).*
- In the process of integration, the political actors will shift their loyalty away from national to supranational institutions.
- Will lead to establishment of elite groups holding pan-European ideas and persuade national elites to turn their loyalties to supranational co-operation.
- Haas also argued that government and non-governmental elites should share the same incremental economic gains for integration to proceed further.

Technocratic Automaticity



Political Actors



Neofunctionalism explains the causes of integration

FOR

- **Neofunctionalism explained the cause for integration through the spill over theory**
- For instance, integration in the coal and steel industry, by the establishment of the ECSC lead to integration in road and rail transport as it would support raw material and finished product movement and hence the smooth functioning of the coal and steel joint venture
- **Political/legislative spill over as laws for material extraction and manufacturing norms would have to be matched.**
- **Interaction and subsequent interdependence between co-workers with different nationalities**
- **Success of such a cooperation results in further creation of institutions;** the ECSC lead to the EURATOM and the EEC

AGAINST

- **The counter theory to spill over is diversity in areas of integration; low and high politics**
- Areas of low politics include those which do not directly and largely affect a nation's survival
- Areas of high politics include those which directly and largely affect a nation's survival
- **Furthermore, it uses the concept of economic determinism**
- Economic determinism refers to political and social relationships developing on foundations laid down by the economic relationships between two parties
- **Integration between two or more nation states would occur only when national interests in areas of high politics coincide and this is beyond just the spill-over theory**
- **Intergovernmentalists believed the fate of a nation must never be subject to other's decisions**

Neofunctionalism proposes purpose to EU integration

FOR

- Neofunctionalism explains the spill over theory eventually leading to a completely integrated Europe with a central governing body
- Signs of this are already seen with the ongoing negotiations of the EU with Croatia and Turkey
- As the number of nations that a part of the EU increases, the fractional say of a particular nation would reduce and the EU would get more centralized and less governed by a particular group of powerful and influential nations

AGAINST

- The sole purpose of any integration is to have a common outlook
- The new entity in the form of EU clearly does not project a common outlook and thought process of different member states
- Intergovernmentalists argue saying economic determinism leading to integration is wrong
- Nation states have to make decisions, especially in areas of high politics and such decisions cannot be economically driven alone
- Cooperation is not ruled out; however such cooperation would be beneficial if it suffices and enhances mutual interests
- Politics would drive integration, motive would be economic

Neofunctionalism provides a good starting point for EU analysis

E

FOR

T

A

- Provides a starting point to understand integration
- Simple enough to explain that two parties with common needs would eventually work together
- Strong enough to explain the outcome of integration and the actors responsible
- Accurate enough to even predict the timeline of the process of integration

B

AGAINST

E

D

- Too simple
- Doesn't take into account external factors; factors that are outside Europe's boundaries
- This was observed in the 1973 oil crisis and subsequent recession
- The 1970s was a time when European integration had taken a hit as nations realized that integration would not help them overcome the oil crisis
- The subsequent oil embargo was announced against the UK and the US. The EU integration process was quite obviously driven by these two major powers
- Neofunctionalism thus does not take into account external pressures of integration

Supranational elites have played a crucial role in integration

FOR

- **The role of supranational entrepreneurs in the role of integration has been crucial**
- **For instance**, Jean Monnet who was responsible for the creation of the ECSC. A similar role was played by Jacques Delors with the SEA(1987) leading to a single market and the all important 1992 project leading to a complete economic and monetary union
- **These characters support the theory of cultivated spill over** which is the idea that institutions drive further integration by being in practice

AGAINST

- **The role of elites acting in their national interests better explains the logic behind integration**
- **For instance**, Charles De Gaulle and his untiring opposition to British membership and QMV in the Council of Ministers and his success in gaining what he set out to achieve through the Luxembourg compromise demonstrates that the true power actually lay with him and the state
- Margaret Thatcher's relentless demand for a British rebate (1979) and her general demeanour in the European Council demonstrated a powerful state elite getting her way. The single market came about because Thatcher wanted it more than most and was thus willing to compromise on certain areas of the SEA(i.e. on QMV in the Council of Ministers)

Limits of the approach

- I. Inter-governmentalists argue that Neofunctionalism ignores the wider concept of integration and doesn't take into account international contexts
- II. It does not apply to regional integration in all settings and of their origins
- III. Neo-functionalism ignores the potential divergence of political development at the domestic level; there are groups within the state that do not share the same political values of elites in other member states
- IV. The concept of "spillover" then was only applicable to Europe in the wrath of the 2nd World War; as of today, it does not apply to less developed countries; this limits the scope of the process of integration
- V. Economic determinism is a largely assumed concept; political and security issues that come under high politics would no longer be driven by economic gains; Neofunctionalism focuses on the foundation of integration being economic interdependence

Limits of the approach II

- I. Adds a degree of automation in the integration process
- II. Doesn't explain limitations to integration put up by the member states
- III. Member states always enjoyed coherent negotiating positions and need not organize interests at domestic/European levels
- IV. Spill-over was not the only mechanism. Ultimately, it were states who decided upon integration for personal interests. Spill-over was just a theory to explain the happenings. Personal and national interests were the initial driving force

Neo-institutionalism

- I. Central to any institutional analysis is the question: how do institutions affect the behavior of individuals? After all, it is through the actions of individuals that institutions have an effect on political outcomes.
- II. In broad terms, new institutionalists provide two kinds of responses to this question, which might be termed the 'calculus approach' and the 'cultural approach' respectively. Each gives slightly different answers to three seminal questions: how do actors behave, what do institutions do, and why do institutions persist over time?

Calculus
approach

Cultural
approach

A calculus approach

- I. **A calculus approach focus on those aspects of human behavior that are instrumental and based on strategic calculation.** They assume that individuals seek to maximize the attainment of a set of goals given by a specific preference function and, in doing so, behave strategically, which is to say that they canvass all possible options to select those conferring maximum benefit. In general, the actor's goals or preferences are given exogenously to the institutional analysis.
- II. **What do institutions do, according to the calculus approach? Institutions affect behavior primarily by providing actors with greater or lesser degrees of certainty about the present and future behavior of other actors.** More specifically, institutions provide information relevant to the behavior of others, enforcement mechanisms for agreements, penalties for defection, and the like. The key point is that they affect individual action by altering the expectations an actor has about the actions that others are likely to take in response to or simultaneously with his own action. Strategic interaction clearly plays a key role in such analyses.

A cultural approach

- I. **Cultural approach stresses the degree to which behavior is not fully strategic but bounded by an individual's worldview.** That is to say, without denying that human behavior is rational or purposive, it emphasizes the extent to which individuals turn to established routines or familiar patterns of behavior to attain their purposes. It tends to see individuals as satisficers, rather than utility maximizers, and to emphasize the degree to which the choice of a course of action depends on the interpretation of a situation rather than on purely instrumental calculation.
- II. **What do institutions do? From this perspective, institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action.** The individual is seen as an entity deeply imbricated in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation, of both the situation and oneself, out of which a course of action is constructed. Not only do institutions provide strategically-useful information, they also affect the very identities, self-images and preferences of the actors.

Neo-institutionalism II

Calculus approach

Suggests that institutions persist because they embody something like a Nash equilibrium.

That is to say, individuals adhere to these patterns of behavior because deviation will make the individual worse off than will adherence. It follows that the more an institution contributes to the resolution of collective action dilemmas or the more gains from exchange it makes possible, the more robust it will be.

Cultural approach

Explains the persistence of institutions by noting that many of the conventions associated with social institutions cannot readily be the explicit objects of individual choice.

Instead, as the elemental components from which collective action is constructed, some institutions are so 'conventional' or taken-for-granted that they escape direct scrutiny and, as collective constructions, cannot readily be transformed by the actions of any one individual. Institutions are resistant to redesign ultimately because they structure the very choices about reform that the individual is likely to make.

Three components of Neo-institutionalism

Historical

Rational

Sociological

Historical institutionalism

Historical institutionalism developed in response to the group theories of politics and structural-functionalism prominent in political science during the 1960s and 1970s. It borrowed from both approaches but sought to go beyond them.

Historical institutionalism

- I. First, historical institutionalists tend to conceptualize the relationship between institutions and individual behavior in relatively broad terms.
- II. Second, they emphasize the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions.
- III. Third, they tend to have a view of institutional development that emphasizes path dependence and unintended consequences.
- IV. Fourth, they are especially concerned to integrate institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes.

Historical institutionalism

- I. **This kind of analysis suggests that the strategies induced by a given institutional setting may ossify over time into worldviews,** which are propagated by formal organizations and ultimately shape even the self-images and basic preferences of the actors involved in them.
- II. **Historical institutionalists have been especially attentive to the way in which institutions distribute power unevenly across social groups.** Rather than posit scenarios of freely-contracting individuals, for instance, they are more likely to assume a world in which institutions give some groups or interests disproportionate access to the decision-making process; and, rather than emphasize the degree to which an outcome makes everyone better off, they tend to stress how some groups lose while others win.

Historical institutionalism

- I. They have been strong proponents of an image of social causation that is 'path dependent' in the sense that it rejects the traditional postulate that the same operative forces will generate the same results everywhere in favor of the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past.**
- II. Historical institutionalists have devoted a good deal of attention to the problem of explaining how institutions produce such paths, i.e. how they structure a nation's response to new challenges. Early analysts emphasized the impact of existing 'state capacities' and 'policy legacies' on subsequent policy choices.**

Historical institutionalism

- I. Historical institutionalists stress the way in which past lines of policy condition subsequent policy by encouraging societal forces to organize along some lines rather than being costly to shift.**
- II. They draw attention to the role of institutions in political life, but historical institutionalists rarely insist that institutions are the only causal force in politics.**
- III. They typically seek to locate institutions in a causal chain that accommodates a role for other factors, notably socioeconomic development and the diffusion of ideas.**

Rational choice institutionalism

- I. **Initially, rational choice institutionalism arose from the study of American congressional behavior. In large measure, it was inspired by the observation of a significant paradox.**
- II. If conventional rational choice postulates are correct, it should be difficult to secure stable majorities for legislation in the U.S. Congress, where the multiple preference-orderings of legislators and multidimensional character of issue should lead to rapid 'cycling' from one bill to another as new majorities appear to overturn any bill that is passed. However, **Congressional outcomes actually show considerable stability. In the late 1970s, rational choice analysts began to ask: how can this discrepancy be explained?**

Rational choice institutionalism

- I. **They argue that stable majorities could be found for legislation because of the way in which the rules of procedure and committees of Congress structure the choices and information available to its members.**
- II. Some of these rules provide agenda control that limits the range and sequence of the options facing Congressional votes. Others apportion jurisdiction over key issues to committees structured so as to serve the electoral interests of Congressmen or provide enforcement mechanisms that make logrolling among legislators possible.
- III. In the most general terms, the institutions of the Congress are said to lower the transaction costs of making deals so as to allow gains from exchange among legislators that make the passage of stable legislation possible.
- IV. **Institutions solve many of the collective action problems that legislatures habitually confront.**

Rational choice institutionalism

- I. The rational choice institutionalists in political science drew fruitful analytical tools from the 'new economics of organization' which emphasizes the importance of property rights, rent-seeking, and transactions costs to the operation and development of institutions.**
- II. Especially, the development of a particular organizational form can be explained as the result of an effort to reduce the transaction costs of undertaking the same activity without such an institution.**
- III. And theories of agency, which focus on the institutional mechanisms whereby 'principals' can monitor and enforce compliance on their 'agents,' proved useful for explaining how Congress structures relations with its committees or the regulatory agencies it superintends.**

Main components of rational choice institutionalism

Behavioral
assumptions

Series of collective
action dilemmas

Role of strategic
interaction in the
determination of
political outcomes

Emergence of
institutions

Behavioral assumptions

Rational choice institutionalist posit that the relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes (usually conforming to more precise conditions such as the transitivity principle), behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of these preferences, and do so in a highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation

Collective action dilemmas

- I. They tend to see politics as a series of collective action dilemmas. The latter can be defined as instances when individuals acting to maximize the attainment of their own preferences are likely to produce an outcome that is collectively suboptimal (in the sense that another outcome could be found that would make at least one of the actors better off without making any of the others worse off).
- II. Typically, what prevents the actors from taking a collectively-superior course of action is the absence of institutional arrangements that would guarantee complementary behavior by others. Classic examples include the 'prisoner's dilemma' and the 'tragedy of the commons' and political situations present a variety of such problems.

Determination of political outcomes

- I. **First, an actor's behavior is likely to be driven, not by impersonal historical forces, but by a strategic calculus**
- II. **Second, that this calculus will be deeply affected by the actor's expectations about how others are likely to behave as well. Institutions structure such interactions, by affecting the range and sequence of alternatives on the choice-agenda or by providing information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about the corresponding behavior of others and allow 'gains from exchange,' thereby leading actors toward particular calculations and potentially better social outcomes.**

Emergence of institutions

- I. Rational choice institutionalists begin by using deduction to arrive at a stylized specification of the functions that an institution performs.
- II. They explain the existence of the institution by reference to the value those functions have for the actors affected by the institution.**
- III. This formulation assumes that the actors create the institution in order to realize this value, which is most often conceptualized, as noted above, in terms of gains from cooperation.**
- IV. Thus, the process of institutional creation usually revolves around voluntary agreement by the relevant actors; and, if the institution is subject to a process of competitive selection, it survives primarily because it provides more benefits to the relevant actors than alternate institutional forms.

Sociological institutionalism

- I. Sociological institutionalism arose primarily within the subfield of organization theory.
- II. The movement dates roughly to the end of the 1970s, when some sociologists began to challenge the distinction traditionally drawn between those parts of the social world said to reflect a formal means-ends 'rationality' of the sort associated with modern forms of organization and bureaucracy and those parts of the social world said to display a diverse set of practices associated with 'culture.'

Sociological institutionalism

- I. **Institutional forms and procedures used by modern organizations were not adopted simply because they were most efficient for the tasks at hand, in line with some transcendent 'rationality.'**
- II. **Many of these forms and procedures should be seen as culturally specific practices,** akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organizations, not necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as a result of the kind of processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices more generally.
- III. The most seemingly bureaucratic of practices have to be explained in cultural terms.
- IV. Given this perspective, the problematic that sociological institutionalists typically adopt seeks explanations for why organizations take on specific sets of institutional forms, procedures or symbols; and it emphasizes how such practices are diffused through organizational fields or across nations.

Main components of sociological institutionalism

Frames of
meaning

New relationship
between
institutions and
individual action

Social
constructivism

Relationship
between
institutions and
individual action

Logic of social
appropriateness

Frames of meaning

The sociological institutionalists tend to define institutions much more broadly than political scientists do to include, not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the 'frames of meaning' guiding human action

Frames of meaning II

It challenges the distinction that many political scientists like to draw between 'institutional explanations' based on organizational structures and 'cultural explanations' based on an understanding of culture as shared attitudes or values.

It tends to redefine 'culture' itself as 'institutions'. In this respect, it reflects a 'cognitive turn' within sociology itself away from formulations that associate culture exclusively with affective attitudes or values toward ones that see culture as a network of routines, symbols or scripts providing templates for behavior.

New relationship between institutions and individual action

- I. **The new institutionalists in sociology also have a distinctive understanding of the relationship between institutions and individual action, which follows the 'cultural approach' described above (but displays some characteristic nuances.**
- II. **An older line of sociological analysis resolved the problem of specifying the relationship between institutions and action by associating institutions with 'roles' to which prescriptive 'norms of behavior' were attached.**
- III. **In this view, individuals who have been socialized into particular institutional roles internalize the norms associated with these roles, and in this way institutions are said to affect behavior.**

Social institutionalism

- I. **They emphasize the way in which institutions influence behavior by providing the cognitive scripts, categories and models that are indispensable for action, not least because without them the world and the behavior of others cannot be interpreted.**
- II. **Institutions influence behavior not simply by specifying what one should do but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context.** Here, one can see the influence of social constructivism on the new institutionalism in sociology

Relationship between institutions and individual action

- I. The sociological institutionalists emphasize the highly-interactive and mutually-constitutive character of the relationship between institutions and individual action.
- II. When they act as a social convention specifies, individuals simultaneously constitute themselves as social actors, in the sense of engaging in socially meaningful acts, and reinforce the convention to which they are adhering.**
- III. The sociological institutionalists insist that, when faced with a situation, the individual must find a way of recognizing it as well as of responding to it, and the scripts or templates implicit in the institutional world provide the means for accomplishing both of these tasks, often more or less simultaneously.**
- IV. The relationship between the individual and the institution, then, is built on a kind of 'practical reasoning' whereby the individual works with and reworks the available institutional templates to devise a course of action.

Logic of social appropriateness

- I. **Organizations often adopt a new institutional practice, not because it advances the means-ends efficiency of the organization but because it enhances the social legitimacy of the organization or its participants.**
- II. **In other words, organizations embrace specific institutional forms or practices because the latter are widely valued within a broader cultural environment.** In some cases, these practices may actually be dysfunctional with regard to achieving the organization's formal goals.
- III. **it as a 'logic of social appropriateness' in contrast to a 'logic of instrumentality.'**

Limits of historical institutionalism

- I. Analysts in this school commonly utilize both 'calculus' and 'cultural' approaches
- II. Historical institutionalism has devoted less attention than the other schools to developing a sophisticated understanding of exactly how institutions affect behavior, and some of its works are less careful than they should be about specifying the precise causal chain through which the institutions they identify as important are affecting the behavior they are meant to explain.
- III. This is one respect in which historical institutionalism might benefit from greater interchange among the schools.

Limits of rational choice institutionalism

- I. Rational choice institutionalism has developed a more precise conception of the relationship between institutions and behavior and a highly generalizable set of concepts that lend themselves to systematic theory-building.
- II. However, these widely-vaunted microfoundations rest on a relatively simplistic image of human motivation, which may miss many of its important dimensions.**
- III. The usefulness of the approach is also limited by the degree to which it specifies the preferences or goals of the actors exogenously to the analysis, especially in empirical cases where these underlying preferences are multifaceted, ambiguous or difficult to specify ex ante.**